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Agencies sometimes give away their legislatively delegated decision-
making power of their own accord. More specifically, agencies make
agreements in order to transfer their entire jurisdiction to adjudicate
administrative decisions to other agencies. This Article is the first to explore
these mostly informal, endogenous interagency arrangements.
One example of this dynamic involves the authority to adjudicate the
legality of pharmaceutical imports and exports, initially delegated by Congress
to the Department of Treasury. Treasury has since transferred this authority to
the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol via interagency agreement, which then
retransferred this authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by
means of another interagency agreement. The FDA does not have clear
statutory authority to make these decisions. However, transferring this set of
adjudications to the FDA allows it to bring its superior technocratic expertise
to bear, which may lead to higher quality decision making.
On the one hand, these arrangements could be harbingers of a future in
which agencies take advantage of opportunities to shirk, deteriorate rule of law
values, and usurp the legislative branch's power to define agency jurisdiction
and make the law. On the other hand, interagency transfers of adjudication
authority represent agencies' potential to improve administrative decision
making by sharing or even transferring power based on their on-the-ground
knowledge of their own varying capacity to implement an efficient and effective
regime of administrative adjudication.
This Article argues that that there is a way to ensure these interagency
transfers of power and responsibilities are both beneficial to the quality of
administrative decision making and also constitutional- in particular, by
allowing those agreements that benefit the quality of administrative decision
making to be deemed legitimate if grounded in statutory language authorizing
interagency coordination. Finally, it proposes that courts play a primary role
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in shaping the development of high-quality interagency transfers of
adjudication authority and ensuring that they remain within permissible
constitutional bounds.
Introduction ................................................................................................ 281
I. Varieties of Transfers ............................................................................. 287
A. Publically Available Agreements ................................................ 291
1. Seasonal W orker Visas ........................................................ 291
2. Pharmaceutical Imports/Exports .......................................... 293
3. Radiation Control Act Compliance ...................................... 295
4. Title VII Claims ................................................................... 296
5. W orkplace Hazard Claims ................................................... 299
6. Counterexample: National Origin Discrimination Claims ..300
II. Impact on Agency Decision M aking ..................................................... 301
A. Rule of Law Concerns ................................................................. 302
1. Accuracy Costs .................................................................... 303
2. Democratic Accountability .................................................. 304
3. Due Process .......................................................................... 309
B. Functional Benefits ..................................................................... 311
1. "Primarily Responsible" Agency ......................................... 312
2. Agency Expertise ................................................................. 314
3. Ameliorating Coalitional Drift ............................................. 315
III. Establishing Legitimate Authority ....................................................... 319
A. Unsatisfying Sources of Authority .............................................. 319
1. Intra-Agency Delegation Power .......................................... 320
2. The Economy Act ................................................................ 323
3. Quasi-Judicial Authority ...................................................... 326
B. Legitimacy in Interagency Coordination Authority .................... 328
1. Flexibility in Authority to Coordinate ................................. 328
2. Interagency Transfers as Coordination ................................ 331
IV. Fostering Beneficial Arrangements ..................................................... 333
A. Interbranch Checking M echanisms ............................................ 334
1. Congress ............................................................................... 334
2. Executive ............................................................................. 337
3. Judiciary ............................................................................... 339
B. A Framework for Judicial Oversight .......................................... 342
1. Standing ............................................................................... 342
2. Encouraging Agency Responsibility (Mead Doctrine) ........ 344
3. Privileging Agency Expertise (Hard Look Review) ............ 346
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 351
280
Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority
Introduction
Agencies often engage in "joint rulemaking" with other agencies on the
basis of shared statutory authority.' Agencies also participate in "coordinated
interagency adjudication," in which they subdelegate portions of their power to
adjudicate administrative claims or share the responsibility of further
administrative decision making on the basis of statutory authority that divides
decision-making tasks among multiple agencies.2 This Article is the first to
bring to light instances in which agencies transfer wholesale their jurisdiction
to adjudicate administrative decisions to other agencies-and in particular, to
agencies that do not have the statutory authority to make these decisions.
Indeed, neither scholars, Congress, courts (save the Tenth Circuit), nor the
executive branch itself 3 has acknowledged these endogenous efforts to
reorganize administrative decision-making power, let alone considered the
impact this activity may have on executive and interbranch lawmaking
mechanisms.
For example, in 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
agreed to let the Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicate seasonal non-
agricultural worker visas (known as "H-2B" non-immigrant visas) and to let the
DOL's denials of such visas stand as the final determination on these visa
petitions. 4 The two agencies based this transfer of decision-making power on a
statute delegating to DHS the power to "consult with the appropriate agencies
of the Government" in deciding whether to grant a foreign worker an H-2B
1. See generally, Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple
Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 78 (2012).
2. See generally Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128
HARV. L. REV. 831-40 (2015). Even though coordinated interagency adjudication has only recently been
acknowledged by scholars, it can be found in various substantive areas of administrative law across the
executive branch. See generally id.; see also RICHARD POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND
THE JUDICIARY 45 (2016) ("Shah shows convincingly that there are serious problems of coordination.");
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2808 (2015) (citing Shah to acknowledge the "growth of
administrative adjudication").
3. The Administrative Conference of the United States currently notes: "Most studies
of federal agency adjudication-by the Conference or others-took place years ago or assessed only
limited aspects of the adjudication process. There is no single, up-to-date resource that paints a
comprehensive picture of agency adjudications across the federal government." Federal Administrative
Adjudication, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/research-projects/federal-administrative-
adjudication (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). While it is currently "undertaking a project to map the
contours of the federal administrative adjudicatory process," its database does not include
information about interagency transfers of adjudication authority. Adjudication Research, Joint
Project of ACUS and Stanford Law School database, https://acus.law.stanford.edu (last visited Feb.
23, 2016).
4. 73 Fed. Reg. 78,020 (Dec. 19, 2008) (DOL); 73 Fed. Reg. 78,104 (Dec. 19, 2008)
(DHS).
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visa.5 In late 2015, in response to litigation brought by employers claiming that
their workers' petitions were unfairly denied by the DOL without review by
DHS, the Tenth Circuit decided that the transfer of this decision-making
authority from DHS to the DOL was an "impermissible subdelegation" of
authority, because it was not a permissible construction of DHS's authority to
"consult."6
In a substantively different area of administrative law, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) long ago delegated the
responsibility to accept Title VII claims on behalf of the EEOC to a
subcomponent of the DOL that deals with federal contractors, perhaps in order
to support the two entities' shared interests.7 There is controversy regarding
whether this delegation is a valid interpretation of statute and whether it
impermissibly deteriorates administrative due process.8 Despite these concerns,
however, the EEOC subsequently arranged to transfer to this DOL
subcomponent the power to adjudicate Title VII claims in their entirety,
without any involvement by the EEOC, on the basis of interagency agreement'
alone .9
While the examples above focus on areas impacting the rights and claims
of individuals, such agreements may also concern the claims of and penalties
faced by institutional and business stakeholders as well. And yet, these
arrangements are often created by agency-driven agreements (like Memoranda
of Understanding ("MOUs")). In this way, these arrangements are substantive,
but also profoundly informal and unanchored. They also exceed traditionally
accepted bounds of both intra- and interagency delegation by allowing for
complete transfers of adjudicatory authority that essentially permit agencies to
redefine their own jurisdiction. For these reasons, they force us to grapple with
the question of whether these agencies are acting on the basis of legitimate
statutory authority.' ° These arrangements also, in turn, push us to consider
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1) (2012).
6. See infra note 45 and accompanying text; G.H. Daniels III & Assoc., Inc. v. Perez,
626 Fed. Appx. 205, 207 (10th Cir. 2015). The court declined to defer to the agency's interpretation,
saying that "[t]he issue we confront is whether an agency may delegate its decision-making
responsibility to an entirely different agency. Courts are quite tolerant of the administrative practices of
agencies, but passing the buck on a non-delegable duty exceeds elastic limits." Id. at 207 (emphasis
added). Referring to interagency transfers of adjudication authority in general as "passing the buck" has
some resonance because of the potential mix of both positive and negative normative impact of these
arrangements.
7. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 1979) ("The
common goal of the EEOC and the OFCCP is to eradicate employment discrimination.").
8. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
9. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n
and the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs § 7(d) (Nov. 9, 2011).
10. Per the government's own expression of constitutional norms: "The
[constitutional] theory ... is that there is inherent in a grant of authority to a department or agency to
perform a certain function, and to expend public funds in connection therewith, a responsibility which,
having been reposed specifically in such department or agency by the Congress, may not be transferred
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when agency interactions may be appropriations of legislative power and to
examine the pervasive assumption that interagency coordination is, for the most
part, constitutional.
Despite their potential lack of statutory basis, these curious agency-led
changes to administrative structure, and the potential for more of them, are not
necessarily bad. Rather, they represent complexities in agency interactions that
require further examination and, as this Article suggests, may even benefit the
administrative state. In addition, agencies' growing reliance on power- and
burden-shifting agreements such as these also serve as an impetus for the
reexamination of core, traditionally rigid structural constitutional principles
such as the nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines. Put another way,
these agreements offer a novel and useful lens through which to view various
governmental dynamics, including those within the executive branch, as well as
between the executive branch and the other two branches of government.
At the very least, the existence of these types of interagency arrangements
destabilizes fundamental assumptions in administrative law scholarship. One
such assumption is grounded in the foundational theory that agencies are
constantly attempting to maintain, grow, and compete for power, or "empire
build."" Another expectation, which has its roots in the empire-building
narrative, is that when agencies interact, they do so in order to augment their
joint capacity, 2 or even compete for power. 13 One more core assumption held
by both scholars and legislators is that agency coordination is squarely based in
the direct legislative delegation of authority to multiple agencies." Arguably,
except by specific action of the Congress." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN.
COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 12-71 (3d. ed. 2004).
11. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (2005) ("[An] enduring and pervasive assumption in constitutional law and
theory is that much government behavior is driven by empire-building, the self-aggrandizing pursuit of
power ... ").
12. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1; Biber, supra note 1; Jody Freeman & Daniel
A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE LJ. 795 (2005); Jason Marisam, Duplicative
Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211
(2015); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SuP.
CT. REV. 201 (2006). Similar to the focus on agency overlap in the law literature is the interest in
bureaucratic "redundancy" in a related school of political science theory; instead of championing agency
overlap, this work views overlap as providing limited benefits that are dependent on circumstance. See,
e.g., Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274, 287
(2003) (suggesting the benefits of redundancy depend on the alignment between Congress's and
agencies' preferences); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 716, 716-17 (1986) (arguing that the institutional
architecture of complex institutions, and in particular their use of functional redundancies, influences
outcomes); see also Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006) (drawing on Ting's
work to "question the siren call of [agency] unification").
13. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in
Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 329 (2013).
14. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2013, at 11 ("Congress bears primary
responsibility for creating ... overlapping functions [across agencies]."); see generally Freeman &
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these assumptions have been formed and reinforced by the literature's and
Congress's focus on joint rulemaking and other types of activity within "shared
regulatory space,"' 5 which often reflects these characteristics.
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority do not conform to this set
of paradigms. For one, they do not help agencies to build their jurisdiction
unequivocally or work together to jointly augment capacity (or even encourage
competition among agencies). Rather, each such arrangement represents an
agency's desire to reduce its delegated power and attendant responsibility by
shifting them to another agency. At base, agencies may give away their
decision-making power for self-interested reasons, such as the desire to relieve
their own bureaucratic burden, and in ways that reduce administrative
transparency. In this way, transferring decision-making power may inoculate
agencies against attempts by the non-executive branches to constrain
consequentialist bureaucratic activity, and may serve to obscure administrative
decision making from the public. For these reasons, these agreements have the
potential to deteriorate ideals of good administrative decision making and
negatively impact the executive branch's accountability to Congress and the
public.
Further, by transferring adjudication authority, an agency may also
frustrate the legislative intent underlying the initial delegation of authority.
Congress may have issued a law with assumptions about how that law is best
enforced that go to the heart of the law itself- including, for instance, an
expectation that a certain agency, with its specific political orientation and
functionalities, is best suited to enforce the law in a manner that honors its true
meaning and intent. Even a high-quality agreement transferring power away
from the agency that was originally delegated the power to adjudicate may not
capture these congressional assumptions. In addition, it may be nalve to expect
that the executive branch will effectively and trustworthily develop and adhere
to reasonable structures of law enforcement and aim to be accountable to the
law, unless agencies are required to play at least some role in the
responsibilities that Congress initially delegated to them, or at least held to
specific and formalized legislative standards.
And yet, interagency transfers of adjudication authority offer significant
potential benefits to administrative decision making. For instance, an agency
that receives a wholesale transfer of adjudication authority based on the terms
Rossi, supra note 1; Biber, supra note 1; Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal
Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 240 (2011); Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian
Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2234-35 (2012); Marisam, supra note 12.
As will be discussed infra Section I.B.1, courts assume this paradigm as well, although thus far they
have not deferred to agencies' interpretation of shared legislative authority.
15. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 13 (introducing the term); see generally Jody
Freeman & Laura 1. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ.
60 (2000); Cameron Holley, Removing the Thorn from New Governance's Side: Examining the
Emergence of Collaboration in Practice and the Roles for Law, Nested Institutions, and Trust, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,656 (2010).
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of an explicit agreement has the autonomy to maintain responsibility for the
adjudication process more so than an agency that has been delegated only part
of an administrative process, which may allow the recipient agency to maintain
better the quality and consistency of decision making. These transfers may also
guard against ad hoc bureaucratic shirking by allowing for predictable burden
shifting, including in instances when it would benefit the adjudication process.
Thus, concrete and explicit agreements to burden-shift in adjudication may
allow agencies to act in ways that acknowledge the realities of their self-
interest, and exploit this impulse to maximize administrative effectiveness. In
addition, these transfers could increase the availability of agency expertise in
administrative adjudication, or otherwise allow agencies to act quickly on
knowledge or intensify competencies that benefit the adjudication process.
Furthermore, these transfers may allow agencies to push back against
coalitional drift caused by arbitrary, political, or punitive new legislative
constraints -particularly those limiting agencies' resources or funding-in
order to better preserve their core functional mandates. Thus, they may not only
improve the general quality of administrative decision making, but also allow
agencies to reshape their own decision making in ways that reenergize the
values underlying the initial transfer of certain adjudicatory responsibilities
from the courts to administrative agencies in the first place.' 6
Overall, this Article suggests that a proactive evaluation of the benefits
and constitutionality of these and other agency-led shifts in administrative
structure could encourage interagency burden shifting that both improves the
quality of agency decision making and operates safely within the bounds of
permissible executive power. More specifically, this Article champions the
development of these unusual interagency agreements on the basis of statutory
language empowering agencies to coordinate, consult, or otherwise interact
with one another, in particular, within a robust system of interbranch
oversight. 7
This project also encourages lawmakers and scholars to take a more
functionalist approach to both the separation of powers and nondelegation
doctrine.' 8 As to the former, this Article argues for privileging the quality of
16. In general, there are benefits to administrative adjudication, including a reduction
in Article III caseloads, increased procedural efficiency, and the potential for agency expertise to
improve the quality of the outcome. These are fundamental qualities motivating the transfer of certain
judicial responsibilities from the courts to administrative agencies. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A.
Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473,476 (2003).
17. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Coordinators Outside the Executive Branch, 128 HARV.
L. REV. FORUM 64, 74 (2014-2015) (responding to Shah by suggesting that identifying "institutions
outside of the executive branch that could provide a bird's-eye view" of coordinated interagency
adjudication is a valuable endeavor).
18. Legal scholars have divided the Supreme Court's separation of powers doctrine
into two approaches. These categories are loosely understood as requiring a separation of tasks and
balance of power between and among the three branches of government, respectively. See M. Elizabeth
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1155-59 (2000); Laura
S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 689 (1996-1997) ("The
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policymaking over formalist determinations of which entities are responsible
for making it, thus reinforcing administrative unilateralism and challenging
conventional checks and balances formulations that caution against allowing
the executive branch to determine its own shape. Regarding the latter, this
Article encourages consideration of the ways in which legislative intent
underlying the delegation of authority to agencies to coordinate may-and
perhaps should-grow over time to encompass burden-shifting dynamics as
well as more traditionally delegated collaborative activity.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I considers the dynamics of
interagency transfers of adjudication authority, including underlying
bureaucratic motivations, and explores examples of these arrangements.
Through comparisons to the public/private delegation context, Part II considers
the functional drawbacks of these interagency arrangements, such as reduced
administrative transparency and due process concerns, and suggests that these
problems are not endemic to these transfers and could be cured by better
written agreements. This Part also identifies the potential benefits of these
interagency transfers, including that they may increase the positive influence of
agency expertise and lead to greater agency responsibility for process quality,
as well as allow agencies to better protect their core functions.
Part III extrapolates lessons from the intra-agency and other interagency
delegation frameworks to contextualize the potential danger to norms of
structural constitutionalism that interagency transfers of adjudication authority
pose. First, this Part examines the shaky legislative bases for existing
interagency transfers of adjudication authority, and concludes that without
statutory authority, these arrangements are ultra vires. This Part then suggests
separation of powers puzzle appears to have stumped the Supreme Court. In a series of decisions over
the last half-century, and particularly in the last twenty-five years, the Court has veered between two
separation of powers doctrines that cannot easily be reconciled. Commentators usually label these two
opposed doctrines 'formalism' and 'functionalism."'); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1946 (2011) ("As Professor Thomas Merrill has put
it, the Court's separation of powers doctrine assumes that 'the Constitution contains an organizing
principle that is more than the sum of the specific clauses that govern relations among the branches.'
Within that framework, what counts for functionalists is the apparent background purpose of balance
among the branches. What counts for formalists is the apparent background purpose of strict
separation."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT.
REV. 225, 226-35 (explaining the Supreme Court's two conceptions of separation of powers, the
"formal" and "functional" approaches); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1605 (2014) ("In the first line of analysis, legal scholars and jurists have
suggested that the choice between formalist and functionalist approaches ... provides a central
organizing principle for thinking about structural constitutionalism."). "The formalist approach
emphasizes the need to maintain three distinct branches of government based on function. The
functionalist approach emphasizes the need to maintain pragmatic flexibility to respond to modern
government." Linda D. Jellum, "Which Is to Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 837, 854-55, (2009); see also
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-37 (1987) (characterizing the former as the "pure" view); see generally
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225,
229-35 (exploring this distinction); Peter R. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-
of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488,489 (1987).
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that, if these transfers in fact foster the benefits discussed in Part 1I, they may
be legitimately based in statutory language authorizing interagency
coordination. This proposal draws from the premise that legislative language
empowering agencies to interact of their own accord encapsulates a
congressional intent to encourage interagency activity that improves the quality
of administrative processes.
Finally, Part IV considers the ability of each branch of government to
determine whether interagency transfers of adjudication authority are legitimate
on this basis, and settles on the judiciary as the most practicable option. This
Article concludes by offering preliminary suggestions for how courts should
determine whether agencies that give away their decision-making power have
remained sufficiently accountable to the ideals of good administrative process,
and how courts might even establish a blueprint for the proliferation of
successful and legitimate interagency burden-shifting in administrative decision
making.
I. Varieties of Transfers
Drawing from agreements that are both new and decades old, agencies
have begun to rely more frequently on arrangements that allow the wholesale
interagency transfer of their authority to adjudicate both administrative
petitions for public benefits and claims to private rights. This Part explores a
number of examples of these interagency transfers of adjudication authority.
The included list of examples expands on my previous work 9 to broach
exploration of "tricky and new terrain. 2 °
At base, interagency transfers of adjudication authority epitomize those
qualities of coordinated interagency adjudication that distinguish it from
rulemaking, and are thus perhaps naturally relatively rare. For instance, while
shirking and burden shifting may be pervasive on an ad hoc basis in other
forms of coordinated interagency adjudication 21 agreements in which agencies
give away their adjudication authority are more radical, in that agencies agree
to burden shift the entirety of their adjudicatory jurisdiction. Further, unlike
joint rulemaking, interagency transfers of adjudication authority are often based
in informal agreement, which renders them more difficult to identify. Indeed,
19. See Shah, supra note 2, at 840-46 (introducing interagency transfers of
adjudication authority as the "substitutable model" of coordinated interagency adjudication).
20. I would like to thank Anne Joseph O'Connell for this insight.
21. In separate work, I have assembled data to establish the prevalence of shirking in
coordinated interagency adjudication. Bijal Shah, Dodging Power (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author). Others have noted the potential for shirking in joint rulemaking. See Todd S. Aagaard,
supra note 14, at 288 (2011); Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New
Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 727 (2013); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation,
38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2006); O'Connell, supra note 12, at 1680; Ting, supra note 12, at 275.
22. See generally supra note 2; Nou, supra note 17; Chris Walker, Shah on
Interagency Adjudication Coordination, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 7, 2015) ("I agree
with Professor Nou that one of the more interesting findings from Professor Shah's examination is the
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locating and gaining access to interagency agreements is challenging because
of both the inconsistency in and lack of availability of these government
records, and the common requirement that information about them is often
obtainable only by finding amenable agency officials. This having been said,
there are enough examples to indicate that these transfers happen and to serve
as fodder for discussion of the under-examined agency dynamics brought to
light by these agreements.
Also unlike rulemaking 3 and coordinated interagency adjudication as a
whole,24 none of the interagency agreements introduced in this Part are based in
specific authority authorizing the interagency transfer of adjudicative authority.
This may be because there is little motivation for Congress to assign an agency
the power to transfer its authority, instead of simply allotting the power to a
second agency. At best, agencies may be taking an aggressive approach to the
application of a statute, 26 one that allows them to operate with relatively loose
interagency guidelines. In general, an agency's opportunity to transfer an
entire decision-making regime to another agency appears to be greater if
very informal nature of the coordination agreement between agencies-which is often in the form of an
interagency memorandum if even that formalized.").
23. In rulemaking, Congress creates "overlapping functions" across agencies fairly
often. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 14, at 11; see generally Michael Doran, Legislative Organization
and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815 (2011); Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14;
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12; Gersen, supra note 12; Marisam, supra note 12. "Such delegations
may reflect congressional dysfunction, or may be a byproduct of the legislative committee process. Or
they may result from purposeful design choices or from compromises necessary to pass legislation."
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12.
24. In coordinated interagency adjudication, the strength of the purported legislative
basis for coordination varies. For instance, agencies may delegate a task in order to make use of another
agency's resources, in service of its own decision-making process. For instance, in a process based in
regulation, HHS often fulfills an investigatory function for DOL, in service of the latter's final
adjudication of claims under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act.
See 20 C.F.R. § 30.2(b); 31 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(1) (2012) (defining authorities eligible to initiate
investigations under the Act). Or, an agency may delegate the responsibility to conduct an analysis that
improves the quality of its own empirical conclusions. One example with a complicated, multi-tiered
basis for authority involves the shared adjudication of cases under federal anti-terrorism and anti-
tampering acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2012); FBI ET AL., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK FOR
AGROTERRORISM (2008), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/InvestigationHandbookAgroterrorism.pdf; 6
U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012); DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HSPD-5, MANAGEMENT OF DOMESTIC
INCIDENTS, 229 (2003). In collaborative interagency arrangements created especially to manage crises,
the DHS, FBI, FDA, and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) work together under both
statutory authority and MOU to decide cases under federal anti-tampering and agro-terrorism acts. See
id. Each of these agencies provides expertise on tampering and terrorism concerns, especially during
times of crisis when these matters are particularly prevalent. See id. Overall, only about twenty percent
of those coordinated interagency processes that are documented as such are authorized by interagency
agreement clearly based in statutory authority. See Shah, supra note 2, at 894-95 app. B.
25. Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (discussing how Congress
intentionally assigns administrative jurisdiction to make certain decisions).
26. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern Administrative
Procedures: The Case for De Novo Review, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 50 & 90-91 (2016) (discussing
agency expansion of its own jurisdiction through aggressive use of internal guidance).
27. Indeed, it is worth noting that the ways in which agencies transfer their power
sometimes remain unconstrained even by the informal authority of the underlying interagency
agreement. See, e.g., supra notes 73 & 90 and accompanying text.
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Congress has not issued in-depth legislation detailing the adjudication process
and if the regime is not consistently monitored by Congress or the public (as in
the immigration context28).
Before looking more closely at these agreements transferring decision-
making authority, it is worth considering what might motivate agencies to enter
into them and how these motivations destabilize current assumptions about how
agencies interact that come from the focus on joint rulemaking in the literature.
Fundamentally, agencies may choose to give away their power to adjudicate-
instead of clamoring for more of it or seeking to share it in lieu of giving it
away, as they do in the regulatory context-because there is relatively little
benefit to and greater bureaucratic burden for an agency tasked with
adjudicating administrative cases.
Unlike rulemaking authority, the jurisdiction to adjudicate is not
considered as meaningful an opportunity to wield influence, and agencies do
not perceive adjudicatory power to be clear evidence of the agency's executive
authority and application of the agency's interests. Rather, an agency's
responsibility to further an adjudication regime is more likely conceived of as a
longer-term drain on resources. Certainly, this overarching theory has some
potential exceptions. For instance, agencies may find adjudicatory authority
attractive if they make policy primarily through adjudication, and not
rulemaking, follow a more "civil law" tradition in which precedent flowing
from administrative courts codifies a strong and salient set of policies over
time, or utilize adjudication in order to reaffirm rulemaking. Further, agencies
may seek out adjudicatory authority in order to issue policy that remains
politically "below the radar" more so than rulemaking, or in response to hostile
courts.29 While identifying and categorizing these agencies is outside the scope
of this project, we may expect to see fewer wholesale transfers of adjudication
authority from an agency whose adjudication regime has a strong policy-
making or politically salient function.
In general, in joint rulemaking, agencies working as partners in a
relatively nonhierarchical arrangement benefit from "the power that comes
from influencing other agencies' actions, the reputational benefits derived from
exhibiting one's skills in a variety of settings throughout the executive branch,
and future contributions to one's own efforts from agencies reciprocating the
interagency contribution .'30 However, agencies are less likely to angle for
28. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(a), 208.14(c)(1) (detailing the relationship between DOJ
and DHS in the adjudication of asylum claims); see also Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum
After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2548 (2014) (noting incomplete and duplicative instances of
immigration regulation); Dory Mitros Durham, The Once and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (and
Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2006) (reviewing the
evolution of the immigration court system). There are myriad sources showing the great interest that
Congress and the public have in immigration reform. See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Dwindling Hopes for
Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2015, at A22.
29. I would like to thank Gillian Metzger for this insight.
30. Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 191 (2013).
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responsibility over tasks in furtherance of administrative adjudication, given
that in coordinated interagency adjudication, agencies are often responsible for
single, discrete parts of the adjudication process and do not "jointly" own any
same task,3' which limits their opportunity to influence other agencies
contributing to the process.
In addition, joint rulemaking with ambiguously overlapping jurisdictions
may facilitate beneficial competition.32 On the other hand, agencies involved in
coordinated interagency adjudication are unlikely to benefit from future
opportunities to show off, compete over the same project for praise from
higher-ups or do favors for one another, again because of the way in which
authority is parsed in this context.33 Thus, the likely benefits to agencies of
upholding or even sharing their responsibilities, instead of shifting them fully to
another agency, are fewer in the coordinated interagency adjudication context
than in shared regulatory space.34
Further, the "threat of jurisdictional loss" serves as an adequate sanction
against transfers of responsibility in joint rulemaking and may even incite a
grab for more power by agencies in that context.3 5 However, because agencies
in coordinated interagency adjudication do not necessarily fear the loss of
adjudicative power, agencies may be likely to welcome the opportunity to "free
ride," because this allows them to expend fewer resources with minimal
potential cost. In essence, because coordinated interagency adjudication is a
non-cooperative system, there is no cooperative exchange from which it may
later be excluded.36
Overall, this set of dynamics both stands in contrast to and augments the
story of agencies as empire-builders. It pushes back against the traditional
narrative, which holds that agencies prefer to build jurisdiction at all costs, by
showing that agencies sometimes give it away. And yet, by giving away
jurisdiction to adjudicate, an agency with the power to leverage a transfer, an
agency with pinched resources that has been charged with a burdensome
adjudication regime, or an agency that sees the opportunity to transfer
jurisdiction to another equally or more expert agency may be able to free up
resources to focus on more attractive tasks. This, in turn, could be conceived of
as a form of empire building that, while not focused on the increase of overall
jurisdiction, nonetheless allows an agency to grow its power in those
substantive competencies it most values.
31. Shah, supra note 2, at 808.
32. Gersen, supra note 11, at 222 (2006).
33. Shah, supra note 2, at 845.
34. Id.
35. Gersen, supra note 11, at 213; see also Marisam, supra note 30, at 187 (noting that
an agency may move to wield power in instances where the agency's interests are threatened by
another's).
36. See Marisam, supra note 30, at 199 (suggesting that if an agency acts as a "free
rider" in cooperative interagency systems, it may be "excluded from the cooperative exchanges in the
future").
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It is also possible that recipient agencies seek expertise in such
adjudication as a way of strengthening claims in the future to a larger
regulatory empire. Perhaps there is some recognition at the agency-wide level
of rooted expertise in adjudication as qualifying the agency to lay claim to
increased regulatory power in future, related matters.37 However, it is unclear
whether agency subcomponents and bureaucrats that implement (and gain
expertise by) adjudication are indeed sought out for regulatory power- in other
words, that increased adjudicatory responsibility truly translates to a better seat
at the rule-making table. The set of examples explored here suggests, rather,
that recipient agencies accept this transfer of adjudicative jurisdiction (and
attendant responsibility) not in order to increase their sheer power, but instead
to foster or strengthen relationships with the often larger and more powerful
agency transferring the authority, or to seek future benefits from the larger
agency such as bolstered resources, support or aid in obtaining congressional
funding.
A. Publically Available Agreements
Overall, a good set of conditions for a transfer to occur appears to be one
in which a larger, more powerful agency with legislative authority to adjudicate
has a pre-existing relationship with a smaller agency or agency subcomponent,
and the former seeks to discharge a resource-intensive, relatively non-policy-
making set of adjudications that fall within the latter's (perhaps even new)
areas of expertise.
1. Seasonal Worker Visas
As noted in the introduction, the one example of an interagency transfer of
adjudication authority that has received attention from the Article III courts is
DHS's transfer of its authority to adjudicate H-2B nonimmigrant seasonal
worker visas to DOL. 38 The H-2B visa program allows employers to petition
for the admission of foreign workers into the United States to perform
temporary nonagricultural work (1) if "unemployed persons capable of
performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country, 3 9 and (2)
when doing so will not "adversely affect the wages and working conditions of
similarly employed United States workers. 4 ° Congress charged DHS with
37. Cf. Gersen, supra note 12, at 212-14 (discussing inter-agency competition over
jurisdiction resulting from judicial emphasis on administrative expertise).
38. 73 Fed. Reg. 78,104 (Dec. 19, 2008) (DHS) ("To better ensure the integrity of the
H-2B program, this rule eliminates DHS's current practice of adjudicating H-2B petitions where the
Secretary of Labor or the Governor of Guam has not granted a temporary labor certification."); 73 Fed.
Reg. 78,020 (Dec. 19, 2008) (DOL). Although DHS and DOL issued the regulations in December 2008,
they did not take effect until January 18, 2009.
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
40. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A).
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implementation of the statute only after mandated "consultation with
appropriate agencies of the Government. '41 Given that both of the above
criteria required to adjudicate H-2B visa petitions are within the expertise of
DOL, DHS decided DOL was an "appropriate agenc[y] of the Government"
with which to consult.42 The agencies were not bound to shape their
relationship in any way, since, as the Tenth Circuit noted in its decision,
Congress did not specify "the nature or scope of that 'consultation. '
The court's decision in this case, which hinges on a basic reading of the
dictionary definition of "consult,"" finds that DOL was vested the authority to
be the final adjudicator of claims without the statutory authority to do so:
DOL is not a subordinate agency of DHS. And there is no statute
authorizing the subdelegation -indeed Congress gave DHS only the
authority to consult with other government agencies. Absent
Congressional authorization, DHS's subdelegation in this case is
improper.
In so concluding, we recognize DHS, as administrator of the INA, has
broad discretion in filling statutory gaps, like the ones present in this case.
But that discretion is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by the language of
the statute and the general prohibition against subdelegation to outside
parties absent congressional authorization. The statutory language in this
case- "consultation"- cannot reasonably bear the construction DHS has
given it- congressional authority to subdelegate its authority and
responsibilities under the H-2B visa program to an outside agency.45
What the court overlooks, in its narrowly textual reading of "consult," is
history indicating that the regulation authorizing the transfer of adjudication
authority was in fact a concretization of a consultative relationship between
DHS and DOL. Initially, DHS sought DOL's advice on above-mentioned
criteria by asking for a case-by-case certification of applications prior to final
adjudication by DHS. Without the DOL certification, DHS would not grant a
petition. After some time, DHS and DOL created a comprehensive policy based
on what was previously a case-by-case consultation with DOL and promulgated
regulations to concretize what had long been, in effect, a final adjudication of
denials by DOL, due to the fact that DHS would not grant the petition unless
DOL certified it. The transfer may or may not have withstood an analysis that
targeted the quality of DOL's certifications, given that DOL was the final
arbiter of many decisions, but the type of consultation the agencies were
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1) (2012).
42. Id.
43. G.H. Daniels III & Assoc., Inc. v. Perez, 626 Fed. Appx. 205, 210 (10th Cir.
2015).
44. Id. at 210-11 (reading from the Oxford English and Black's Law Dictionaries).
45. Id. at 212.
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engaging in was not unusual.46 Indeed, to the extent the court's decision allows
for a system in which the DOL determination is final in practice,
notwithstanding a formal but rarely exercised option for appeal to DHS, it
preserves only the appearance of DHS authority and thereby risks adding the
inefficiencies of separate appeals processes without the gain associated with
two robust, complementary paths to a decision.47
2. Pharmaceutical Imports/Exports
In an interagency transfer of adjudication authority involving more than
two agencies, the Department of Treasury, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) (a subcomponent of DHS), and the FDA have transferred among
themselves the authority to adjudicate the legality of pharmaceutical imports
and exports. Treasury was initially given the statutory authority to adjudicate
claims involving the admission of illegal imported and exported drugs . Under
interagency agreement alone, Treasury delegated both its adjudicative and
enforcement authority in these claims to the CBP.4 9 This delegation may have
occurred because of the desire to maintain certain responsibilities within the
CBP that were originally part of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), originally a
component of the Treasury until the creation of the DHS and the transformation
of the USCS into the CBP,50 but this is not a justification offered by the
interagency agreement itself.
In turn, the CBP further delegated the authority to refuse admission of
illegal imported drugs to FDA field offices, but kept enforcement authority
over these decisions (perhaps because the CBP has expertise in enforcement). 51
Now, the FDA adjudicates these claims, but in the CBP's name-indeed, it
literally "rubber stamps" claims adjudications with a seal reflecting the CBP
leadership.52 If necessary, the FDA also has authority to conduct related
import/export hearings.5 3 In this way, the authority to adjudicate these claims
46. See Shah, supra note 2, at 846-50 (discussing arrangements in which agencies
collaborate to further administrative adjudications).
47. I would like to thank Gillian Metzger for this insight.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 381(a).
49. FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 9-9, at 36 (2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManua/UCM074300.
pdf.
50. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 414 F.3d 50, 51
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the
Forward Deployment of the U.S. Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, 202 n.39 (2007).
51. See FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 49, at 36.
52. As the FDA's Regulatory Procedures Manual states: "Each FDA district shall have
a facsimile stamp of the signature of the Regional or District Director of CBP prepared for this purpose
and supplied to the appropriate personnel, or have written delegation of authority from the District
Director of CBP to issue the Notice of Refusal of Admission under FDA personnel signature. A new
stamp should be prepared each time there is a change of personnel in the Regional or District Director of
CBP position." Id.
53. Id. at 34-36
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has, over time, been vested in more than one agency not originally
contemplated by Congress for that purpose, and eventually landed in an agency
exercising the adjudication authority of another. More specifically, while
statutory language appears vague enough to allow the Treasury to delegate with
some autonomy, this language does not delegate to Treasury the freedom to
make a wholesale transfer of decision-making jurisdiction.54
And yet, there are factors that may have contributed to this multi-step
interagency transfer of adjudication authority that are consistent with the nature
of the relationship among these agencies and that proffer functional benefits,
even if Congress has not expressly authorized the transfer. For one, Treasury
has long coordinated at the local level with the FDA in order to jointly improve
their respective adjudication processes5-for instance, the FDA provides some
drug analysis services for Treasury.56 The FDA may have been further
motivated to enter the agreement to ensure that Treasury is supportive of the
FDA's national structure and directives before Congress, or even willing to
facilitate the improvement of the sometimes contentious relationship between
the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 57 as a
result of the FDA's efforts on its behalf.
In addition, although the power to refuse illegal pharmaceutical exports
was delegated by Congress to Treasury alone,58 and "[p]rimary responsibility
for administering the nations [sic] laws relating to import, export and the
collection of duties" has been delegated to the CBP, 59 the transfer of authority
to refuse the admission of illegal imported drugs to the FDA is based on the
shared understanding that the FDA has an expertise in and should maintain
some holistic responsibility for "the protection of the U.S. public regarding
foods, drugs, devices, electronic products, cosmetics, and tobacco products. 6 °
54. See Shah, supra note 2, at 889 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 381(a)).
55. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep't of the Treasury, U.S.
Customs Serv. and the Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 20, 1974) (referencing a "system of individual
agreements at the local level" between the Treasury and the FDA).
56. See id. (noting that Treasury has the ultimate authority over these adjudications,
but that in practice the FDA accomplishes them, and suggesting that because the "system of individual
agreements at the local level has been inefficient for both agencies .... [B]oth agencies believe that a
comprehensive delegation of authority for the enforcement of Section 801 should be accomplished").
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 381 (a) & (b) (describing the ways in which Treasury is required to
bring information about drug imports and exports to HHS).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 381(a).
59. FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 49, at 2.
60. Id. at 9-10 (citing nonspecific statutory authority including the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Import Milk Act/Filled Milk Act, Federal
Caustic Poison Act, Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act, Public Health Service Act, Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and the Comprehensive Smoking Tobacco Health and
Education Act of 1986).
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3. Radiation Control Act Compliance
In a health and safety example of interest to both domestic and
international institutions, the CBP has transferred to the FDA the CBP's
authority 61 to adjudicate decisions regarding whether to accept or reject
declarations that products are compliant under the Radiation Control for Health
and Safety Act62 -in particular, the responsibility to "determin[e] ...
compliance status, and the sampling procedures of imported electronic products
subject to" this Act.63 As the updated interagency agreement underlying this
arrangement states:
Since the statute vests in the Secretary of the Treasury authority to deliver
samples of imported products to FDA for analysis, the statute has always
been construed as identifying the Secretary of the Treasury as having the
authority to collect the samples and issue the corresponding "Notice of
Sampling". [sic] Similarly, since the statute vests in the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority to destroy any article which has been refused
admission, based upon the results of the FDA analysis, this language has
also been construed as identifying the Secretary of the Treasury as having
authority to refuse admission and issue the corresponding "Notice of
Refusal of Admission". [sic]
In actual practice, FDA personnel at most ports, collect the samples, issue
the appropriate notice of sampling, and, where applicable, having
determined that an article is in violation of the Act and may not be brought
into compliance, issue a refusal notice. Actions by an FDA employee have
been under written delegated authority received from the local District
Director of Customs. This system of individual agreements at the local
level has been inefficient for both agencies. Thus, to promote efficiency
and uniformity, both agencies believe that a comprehensive delegation of
authority for the enforcement of Section 801 should be accomplished. 64
The underlying relationship between the CBP and FDA in this example is
similar to the one between DHS and DOL in the H-2B visa dynamic discussed
earlier, in that the CBP delegated the authority to adjudicate violations of the
Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act to the FDA on a case-by-case
basis before agreeing to create a more comprehensive policy. The distinction
between the regulations promulgated by DHS and DOL and this agreement
61. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Customs Serv. and the
Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 20, 1974); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep't of the
Treasury, U.S. Customs Serv. and the Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 14, 1979).
62. See Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 90-602 § 358 (1968)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012)). This agreement also relies on the Economy Act for statutory
justification.
63. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep't of the Treasury, U.S.
Customs Serv. and the Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 20, 1974).
64. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Customs Serv. and the
Food & Drug Admin. supra note 61.
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between the CBP and FDA is that the latter is not based in a specific reading of
legislation (as in the case of DHS and DOL, on the authority to consult with
"appropriate agencies of the Government" 65), but instead relies on a claim to
unspecified broad statutory authority. 66
4. Title VII Claims
In another example referenced earlier, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), a subcomponent of the DOL that deals with federal contractors, have
wrought an agreement that transfers the authority to adjudicate Title VII claims
to the OFCCP. This agreement is like the DHS/DOL worker H2-B visa
arrangement, in that it also focuses on the adjudication of matters concerning
individuals. Under this interagency agreement, the OFCCP is authorized to
adjudicate Title VII cases on behalf of the EEOC.6 v More specifically, the
OFCCP may also "investigate, process, and resolve allegations of
discrimination of a systemic or class nature on a Title VII basis in ...
complaints/charges" that are filed with both the EEOC and the OFCCP. 6 8 To do
this, the OFCCP makes an initial decision in the case by determining whether
there is "reasonable cause" for the Title VII complaint.69 If the OFCCP
determines there is not, the case is closed without any EEOC involvement and
without the option of appeal by the claimant.7v
While the EEOC's and OFCCP's authority to further their separate set of
adjudications is likewise based in separate statutes, v" the agencies appear to be
interpreting the shared goal underlying each adjudication regime as a basis for
the intermingling and transfer of their separate adjudicative authorities. 2 As
such, this interagency agreement vests in the OFCCP authority to adjudicate
Title VII cases without a direct statutory delegation of power to do so. Further,
according to the agreement underlying the EEOC's transfers of jurisdiction to
adjudicate Title VII claims to the OFCCP, the EEOC may choose to act in
accordance with guidelines indicating when they should take possession of the
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1 84(c)(1) (2012); see also G.H. Daniels III & Assoc., Inc. v. Perez,
626 Fed. Appx. 205,208 (10th Cir. 2015).
66. Id. (citing "Section 801 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the
Recovery Act" as the only substantive authority for the agreement); 21 U.S.C. § 381 (2012).
67. Id. § 7(d) (Nov. 9, 2011) ("OFCCP will act as EEOC's agent for the purposes of
investigating, processing and resolving the Title VII component of dual filed complaints/charges .... ").
68. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n and the U.S. Dep't of Labor Office of Fed. Coordination of Functions (Nov. 9,2011).
69. Id. at § 7(d)(3).
70. Id.
71. See id. at § 7(d).
72. See id.; see generally Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 903 (8th
Cir. 1979) (validating an inter-agency MOU authorizing the two agencies to share their investigative
functions).
Vol. 34, 2017
Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority
case, or it may not73-in which case the OFCCP may, for instance, take on
more Title VII cases than originally anticipated by the agencies when entering
into the agreement or the agencies may continue to implement their informal
authority to transfer cases in some other, also expansive way.74 Therefore, even
if the agreement were to have more than a tenuous link to specific legislation,
the fact that the agencies have the discretion to apply the agreement at will
dilutes any underlying statutory control over the agency activity.
Nonetheless, this agreement represents an effort by the two agencies to
make their respective attempts to eradicate employment discrimination more
efficient,75 a collaboration that may have some basis in legislation.76 Similar to
the FDA's relationship to Treasury, the OFCCP in this example may have been
interested in taking on adjudicatory responsibility on behalf of the EEOC in
order to benefit the OFCCP's status. More specifically, this agreement may
improve the OFCCP's reputation within its own agency, the DOL at large, not
least because by adjudicating on behalf of the EEOC, the OFCCP is also
cultivating the EEOC's view of and relationship with DOL leadership.7
Further, these agencies also have a preexisting relationship, similar to
agencies in agreements described earlier,7 8 that led to this transfer of the full
authority to adjudicate Title VII from the EEOC to the OFCCP in those cases
filed with the OFCCP. The difference here, as compared to earlier examples, is
that the transfer of authority did not constitute an increase in the magnitude of
interagency interaction (moving from a case-by-case consultation or delegation
to a wholesale one), but rather, a change in kind.
Historically, the OFCCP acted "as the EEOC's agent for the purposes of
receiving Title VII complaints."7 9 A number of individual claimants brought
suit suggesting that even delegation of a discrete task to the OFCCP-namely,
that of accepting Title VII claims on behalf of the EEOC-is in violation of
statute. 80 Courts have responded in various ways that suggest the potential for
73. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n and the U.S. Dep't of Labor Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs § 7(d) (Nov. 9,
2011).
74. See id.
75. Emerson Elec. Co., 609 F.2d at 903-04 ("The common goal of the EEOC and the
OFCCP is to eradicate employment discrimination. The agencies' areas of responsibility, however, are
distinct.").
76. See id. (noting that "there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Congress intended
the two agencies to cooperate and share information when possible" and citing statute and legislative
history to suggest that the Civil Rights Act "contains ample evidence of intent to authorize cooperation
and information exchanges between the EEOC and the OFCCP").
77. There are parallel instances in which the OFCCP took on a delegation of discrete
tasks from the EEOC to make its "parent," the DOL, happy. See Meckes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 604 F.
Supp. 598,601 (N.D. Ala.) affid, 776 F.2d 1055 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Emerson Elec. Co., 904.
78. See, e.g., supra notes 38-46 & 61-66 and accompanying text.
79. See Shah, supra note 2, at 841.
80. See Williams v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 721 F.2d 1412, 1416-17 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) ("Moreover, remand is necessary to determine whether OHR possessed the apparent
authority to act on EEOC's behalf in this case. Unlike actual agency, which exists whether or not the
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the delegation of this task to interfere with an individual's rights under
administrative due process."
Most recently, this delegation created a frustrating dynamic in which the
OFCCP was able to accept claims under Title VII on behalf of the EEOC under
interagency agreement, but individuals could not rely on this acceptance of
claims by the OFCCP as evidence that the EEOC has received them per the
statutory requirements, including in instances where the EEOC did not receive
the claim due to the OFCCP's failure to transfer it. 82 While the newest
agreement described here-that the OFCCP may now not only accept Title VII
claims, but adjudicate them fully on behalf of the EEOC-has not yet been
litigated, it is perhaps a matter of time before a claimant is again caught in the
grey area between statutory authority and the agencies' apparent authority
under interagency agreement. On the other hand, while even nonsubstantive
coordination and the partial delegation of tasks from the EEOC to the OFCCP
was a controversial interpretation of statute83 and the subsequent full transfer of
the authority to adjudicate Title VII claims to the OFCCP could prove similarly
problematic, it is also possible that this latter transfer could cure the issue
caused by the former arrangement by eliminating the need for the OFCCP to
transfer the claims and allowing it to remain in better control of the process by
adjudicating them itself.
third party knows of or suspects an agency relationship, apparent agency depends in large part upon the
representations made to the third party and upon the third party's perception of those representations. In
other words, in the present case, one of the questions the district court must ask is whether Williams
detrimentally relied on OHR's apparent authority to receive charges on behalf of the EEOC at the time
he lodged a charge with OHR." (citations omitted)); Meckes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 604 F. Supp. 598,
601 (N.D. Ala.) aff'd, 776 F.2d 1055 (11 th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that a MOU provision stating that
"' [c]omplaints filed with OFCCP within the jurisdiction of EEOC which OFCCP refers to EEOC shall
be deemed charges filed jointly with EEOC' is illegitimate in regards to age discrimination claims
because the OFCCP has no jurisdiction over these claims); see also Emerson Elec. Co., 609 F.2d at 904
("The appellants assert that the Memorandum is ... in defiance of congressional intent.").
81. See, e.g., Walker v. Novo Nordisk Pharm. Indus., Inc., 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.
2000); Petrelle v. Weirton Steel Corp., 953 F.2d 148, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1991) (penalizing claimant for not
filing directly with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission (WVHRC), even though the
agreement between the EEOC and the WVHRC "provides that 'the EEOC and the WVHRC each
designates the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving charges"').
82. See Walker v. Novo Nordisk Pharm. Indus., Inc., 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000)
("Relying upon a Memorandum of Understanding ('MOU') between the OFCCP and the EEOC
concerning the filing of complaints, and upon our prior decision in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,
564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir.1977), Walker asserts that by filing a complaint with the OFCCP, he tolled the
time period for filing with the EEOC. We disagree. In rejecting Walker's claim that his EEOC claim
was timely, we look to the plain language of Title VII and the MOU in effect at the time Walker filed his
complaint with the OFCCP. Title VII requires that a charge be filed with the EEOC, which in turn
triggers the investigatory and remedial process called for by the Act. The Act does not, however,
contemplate that filing a complaint with another agency can or should be deemed a filing with the
EEOC ...." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). The court decided this, despite the fact that it was a
failure on the part of the government (the OFCCP) to transfer the claim to the appropriate adjudicating
body (the EEOC). See id.
83. See id.
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5. Workplace Hazard Claims
Finally, in one more example involving matters of health and safety, the
DOL Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under authority of MOU, have
agreed to transfer workplace hazard claims to each other, or take on cases
themselves, depending on each agency's claimed level of resources and
dependent somewhat (per these agencies' informal agreement) on which
agency initially accepted the claim.84 Technically, only the EPA is authorized
to adjudicate claims under the series of Acts dealing with environmental risks
that could potentially be related to workplace hazards,85 while only OSHA has
the power to adjudicate claims under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
86
Further, OSHA apparently draws its authority to adjudicate the EPA's
workplace hazard claims from only its organic statute, 87 while the EPA claims
authority to adjudicate OSHA workplace hazard claims88 on the basis of a vast
number of statutes .89 However, the exchange of these claims for various
bureaucratic purposes or even in order to improve these agencies' collective
decision making is not strictly authorized by statute.
84. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Labor Occupational
Safety & Health Admin. and the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Enforcement § III(C) (Feb. 13,
1991).
85. These include, but are not limited to, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2641 (2012) (governing the removal of asbestos); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (2012) (governing the release of air pollutants); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (2012) (governing the pre-treatment and release of pollutants to water); the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2012) (governing the
release of hazardous substances and the abatement of toxic and hazardous waste sites); the Emergency
Planning & Community-Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-50 (2012) (governing the storage,
use and disposal of toxic and hazardous chemicals, including the reporting of accidental releases); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (2012) (governing the storage and
disposal of hazardous wastes); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012)
(governing the treatment and distribution of portable water); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide &
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2012) (governing the manufacture and use of toxic and
hazardous chemicals used for pest control); and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
71(2012).
86. See Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1970).
87. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Labor
Occupational Safety & Health Admin. and the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Enforcement § I(C)
(Feb. 13, 1991) (suggesting that OSHA's authority to play hot potato with the EPA is based on the
"OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 651, [under which] every employer has a general duty, under section 5(a)(l), to
furnish employment and a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing,
or likely to cause, serious physical harm. Every employer is also required, under section 5(a)(2), to
comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated by OSHA.").
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89. These include: the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act; the Clean Air Act;
the Clean Water Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act; the
Emergency Planning & Community-Right-To-Know Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act;
the Safe Drinking Water Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act; the Toxic
Substances Control Act; the Underground Injection Control Act; and the Organotin Paint Act. See
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Admin.
and the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Enforcement § HI(C) (Feb. 13, 1991).
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More specifically, this arrangement appears more traditionally a form of
"coordination" than do the previous examples, because they involve relatively
frequent communication between the agencies. Further, these back-and-forth
transfers allow agencies to shift their responsibility to adjudicate claims,
including some with significant administrative due process requirements, in
part because of the vague way in which the agreement is worded. One example
of a permissively worded section of the agreement is as follows:
There will be the fullest possible cooperation and coordination between
EPA and OSHA, at all organizational levels, in developing and carrying
out training, data and information exchange, technical and professional
assistance, referrals of alleged violations, and related matters concerning
compliance and law enforcement activity to ensure the health and well-
being of the Nation's workforce, the general public, and the environment
.... EPA and OSHA may conduct joint inspections as necessary ....
Such inspections may be scheduled on an ad hoc basis .... EPA shall
respond to referrals from OSHA, and OSHA shall respond to referrals
from EPA ... when appropriate .... 90
However, the shared goal of the agencies-"to improve the combined
efforts of the agencies to achieve protection of workers, the public, and the
environment at facilities subject to EPA and OSHA jurisdiction" 91-could
theoretically benefit from even this sort of improvised, piecemeal interagency
coordination.
6. Counterexample: National Origin Discrimination Claims
For the sake of comparison, included here is an agreement in which
agencies are not transferring their adjudication authority, but rather
coordinating in a manner that specifically retains each agency's own statutory
decision-making jurisdiction. The EEOC and DOJ Special Counsel for
Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices have entered into an
interagency agreement to make information available and provide other
assistance 92 to one another that would be useful to the former's adjudication of
Title VII claims and the latter's consideration of issues of national origin
discrimination under the Immigration and Naturalization Act.9 3 Their clear
90. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational
Safety & Health Admin. and the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement § HI(A-C) (Feb. 13,
1991) (emphasis added).
91. Id.§I.
92. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices
(Dec. 18, 1997) (stating, for instance, that "the EEOC and the Special Counsel shall make available for
inspection and copying to officials from the other agency any information in their records pertaining to a
charge or complaint being processed by the requesting agency").
93. See id.
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intention (at least on paper), however, is to maintain authority over those claims
that they are legislatively empowered to adjudicate, and to ensure that neither
agency mistakenly treads on the other's jurisdiction:
When, during the processing of a charge by either agency, it becomes
apparent to the agency processing the charge that the charge or any aspect
of the charge falls outside its jurisdiction, but may be within the
jurisdiction of the other agency, the agency processing the charge will
immediately dismiss as much of the charge as may fall within the
jurisdiction of the other agency and, if the charging party has not declined
referral, refer the dismissed aspects of the charge to the other agency, and
notify the charging party and the respondent of the referral. In determining
whether to refer such a charge or such aspect of a charge to the other
agency, the agency processing the charge shall be guided by the attached
Guidelines 94
This delineated interest in maintaining separate jurisdiction to make the
final determination on a claim distinguishes more common forms of
coordinated interagency adjudication95 from the types of transfers brought to
light in this Article.
II. Impact on Agency Decision Making
This Part considers the potential drawbacks and benefits of the agreements
introduced in the previous Part. Of relevance to this discussion is a defining
characteristic of interagency transfers of adjudication authority: that when an
agency gives away its decision-making power, it is no longer involved in the
set of adjudications that it has transferred to another agency. This characteristic
renders them fundamentally unlike agreements in which agencies delegate
discrete tasks to other agencies or exchange competencies in service of both
agencies' decision-making needs.96
In interagency transfers of adjudication authority, the agency with the
original jurisdiction is not, for instance, gathering outside information,
outsourcing an analytic task in service of its own adjudication, or even just
dicing and distributing those portions of its decision-making process over
which it nonetheless has final authority. 97 Rather, the original agency fully
transfers its authority to both further and complete an adjudication process to
another agency. As will be discussed in this Part and the next, this criterion is
94. See id. at § II.
95. See generally Shah, supra note 2.
96. See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text (listing sources describing
shared rulemaking, all of which involve only piecemeal interagency delegation).
97. See Shah, supra note 2, at 820-21 (providing an overview of these elements of
many coordinated interagency adjudications); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power
Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1067 (2011); Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative
Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 101 (2003).
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both important to the analysis of the drawbacks and benefits of these transfers
to the quality of agency decision making, and crucial to a consideration of the
constitutionality of these agreements-or, as the Tenth Circuit put it while
deciding the DHS/DOL H-2B visa case, to a determination of whether an
agency has the "congressional authority to subdelegate its authority and
responsibilities."98
A. Rule of Law Concerns
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority could negatively impact the
quality of administrative decision making and interfere with public law values.
The next few subsections anticipate potential related problems by examining
the agreements introduced in the previous Part and comparing them to similar
dynamics in the delegation of responsibilities from agencies to the private. 9"
The sector public/private delegation context both provides an instructive
framework'00 for evaluation of interagency transfers of adjudication authority
and serves as a bridge between its own and the agency coordination bodies of
scholarship."m '
98. G.H. Daniels III & Assoc., Inc. v. Perez, 626 Fed. Appx. 205, 212 (10th Cir.
2015).
99. Agencies delegate or outsource their responsibilities not only to one another, but
also to private companies or nongovernmental organizations, even within coordinated interagency
adjudications. For instance, DOJ has outsourced a portion of its responsibility to ensure due process for
unaccompanied minors in immigration proceedings. See Office of Legal Access Programs, U.S. DEP'T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-legal-access-programs (last visited May 21, 2015)
(illustrating how DOJ has intermittently funded a small (one- or two-person) in-house committee tasked
with reaching out to non-governmental organizations, such as the Vera Institute, to connect a limited
number of juveniles to limited forms of non-legal advocacy, among other responsibilities). Another
responsibility of this office involves procuring those same experts to speak to detained noncitizens about
how to advocate for themselves within the immigration process. See id.
100. On the one hand, as Harold Krent notes, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Supreme
Court invalidated public/private delegations under the nondelegation doctrine in part because of the
latitude that was given to private actors as part of the proposed statutory scheme. See also Harold J.
Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 507, 510 (2011). While Krent suggests that questions specific to the nondelegation doctrine have
not moved the Supreme Court to alter the nature of public/private delegation in any significant way
since the early 1930s, id., Lisa Bressman argues that a line of doctrine begun by Schechter Poultry may
have revived the nondelegation doctrine in the public/private context by "invok[ing] the principles that
underlie those cases and are traditionally captured by the concept of delegation: the requirement of
limiting standards and the prohibition on private lawmaking." Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry
at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1401
(2000). See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 99 S. Ct. 721 (1999) (invalidating an FCC
interpretation for failure to contain administrative limiting standards and for permitting private parties to
fix the content of law). Bressman notes, however, that "it did so in a new way. Instead of striking down
the statutory delegation ... the Court ... effectively required the agency to pick up where Congress had
left off [by] supply[ing] the very limiting standards that had once been Congress's responsibility."
Bressman, supra.
101. As of now, there is not much overlap between law and scholarship concerning
interagency cooperation and agency delegation to private entities. As noted earlier, much of the agency
coordination scholarship focuses on the ways agencies can work together when Congress has delegated
the same regulatory space to more than one agency. Much of the private delegation scholarship, on the
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One consideration worth highlighting while reading these subsections is
that, because these arrangements stem from explicit, concrete agreements
between agencies, agencies may have the opportunity to cure many of these
problems by constructing better agreements. Put another way, these drawbacks
of transferring adjudication authority might be fixed (albeit not easily) by
improving institutional design.0 2 Superior interagency contracts could create
specific standards and procedures to ensure fidelity to beneficial agreements,
legislative standards and administrative norms in spite of agencies' competing
self-interest or desire to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
1. Accuracy Costs
As an initial matter, interagency transfers of adjudication authority may
harm administrative decision making to the extent that agency burden shifting
in any capacity can have a negative effect, including as a result of shirking,
drift, or capture.'0 3 For instance, wholesale agency transfers of jurisdiction to
adjudicate could reduce the quality of administrative decision making if the
reasons for the transfer are only self-interested and not motivated by agencies'
interest in high-quality outcomes, or if the agency miscalculates the benefits of
the transfer. Or, agencies might be motivated to transfer authority for purposes
of convenience or resource conservation more so than a fundamental belief that
the agency to which jurisdiction is being transferred has comparable or greater
capacity to adjudicate the claim. For example, regarding the transfer of Title
VII cases from the EEOC to OFCCP, it is unlikely that the DOL subcomponent
has the same depth of knowledge as the EEOC in this arena. Thus, the EEOC's
motivation to reduce its own, immense caseload may have played an outsized
role in the consideration of whether to transfer this authority. Then again, that
EEOC has a high enough volume of cases that it is difficult for EEOC officials
to devote sufficient time to cases may offset the benefits of EEOC expertise, °4
allowing the transfer to benefit both the agency's self-interest and adjudication
regime.
other hand, focuses on governmental authority to delegate to private entities, and the constitutional and
policy concerns that arise from this delegation. Questions about the authority to delegate occupy less of
the agency coordination scholarship.
102. This suggestion draws from the institutional design school of thought, which
"asks how to 'divid[e] the government into units that will provide the best possible set of public policies
and government services' [and] treats policy outcomes as a function of the architecture of adjudicative
institutions." Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1421 (2012)
(quoting David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113
YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004)); see also Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 12; Todd L. LaPorte & Paula M.
Consolini, Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of "High-Reliability
Organizations," 1 J. PUB. ADMIN.RES. &THEORY 19,21-22 (1991).
103. "Public employees might shirk and focus on leisure rather than work. They might
drift and emphasize their own preferences rather than agency goals. Finally, they might get captured and
execute the desires of a third party." Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 889 (2014).
104. I would like to thank Aziz Huq for this insight.
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Agencies may also face some pressure from those they regulate to
strengthen the involvement of agencies that, traditionally, have handled the
types of issues being adjudicated or are that are otherwise more sympathetic to
the third party's interests. Even agencies motivated to transfer their
adjudication authority for substantive reasons may initiate transfers that
inadvertently deteriorate the quality of administrative decision making. For
instance, CBP may have transferred its decision-making power to the FDA in
more than one instance due to the CBP's knowledge of and respect for the
FDA's expertise, or pressure from private entities who are more comfortable
conducting business under oversight of a better established agency like the
FDA. Still, whether the CBP was correct in doing so is less certain in some
cases than in others. While it makes some intuitive sense to transfer to the FDA
the power to adjudicate claims concerning the legality of pharmaceutical
imports and exports, it is not as clear that the FDA (as opposed to another
agency with more pointed expertise) should be put in charge of adjudications
under the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act.10 5 In sum, any of these
factors could lead to power placed into the hands of an agency more poorly
suited to accomplish the adjudication than the agency to which the authority
was initially delegated.
2. Democratic Accountability
By altering decision-making structures and transferring jurisdiction in a
manner not anticipated by Congress or the public, agencies may be able to
distance themselves from both the intentions and restrictions of legislation,
including standards, reporting requirements, and political pressures, and thus
also remain unaccountable to related constitutional expectations, administrative
precedent and legislative policy. More specifically, agency-to-agency transfers
of power also create opportunities for insulated agencies to act in self-interested
ways that differ from the expectations of the public to which the executive
branch must remain accountable. A similar dynamic-and related interest in
limiting the authority of unelected and politically unaccountable actors who
may exercise power in self-interested ways-drives the principal-agent theory
underlying private nondelegation doctrine. In the public law context, the
principal is arguably civil society (perhaps as represented by the legislative
branch, for nondelegation purposes).0 6
After an agency transfers its decision-making authority to another agency,
the public may be unaware of and at least a few steps removed from the entity
with actual power over the delegated process. For instance, were the CBP to
have kept the transferred authority to adjudicate the legality of drug imports
105. Here, the CBP may have taken advantage of a pre-existing relationship with the
FDA in order to continue to further bureaucratic aims best served by burden shifting.
106. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1,64-80 (2014).
Vol. 34, 2017
Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority
and exports (instead of retransferring it to the FDA), the CBP's overwhelming
interest in securing the border may have skewed its decision making. Initially,
this may have comported with the desires of the partisan Congress that drafted
the initial legislation, or with the intention of Treasury in handing over this set
of adjudications. But if it did not, in fact, improve the quality of adjudication,
Congress and affected businesses may not have identified this problem, let
alone pressured the CBP to broaden its analysis.
In the public/private delegation context, there are also concerns about how
accountable the private delegate will be, in part because it is unclear whether
constitutional tenets govern the private entity or not. °7 In contrast, all executive
agencies are ostensibly bound by the same administrative and constitutional
conventions (such as state action doctrine), whose breadth could improve
accountability in an agency delegate even though it may not reach private
actors. Similar to the public/private setting, however, the agency authority to
which adjudication responsibility has been transferred wholesale via
interagency agreement may be shielded from expectations and accountability to
the quality of process that are required by statute (if not those required
constitutional conventions).
Indeed, just as a private agent is not governed by constitutional law that
applies only to public principals, an agency receiving adjudication authority
may not be, in fact, under strict control of the legislation that gave authority to
the transferring agency. For example, it is unclear whether the reporting and
information-gathering requirements that the EEOC must comply with have
been implemented adequately by the OFCCP in its adjudication of Title VII
claims. In general, this matter is likely compounded in interagency transfers of
adjudication authority by the fact that the original agency retains neither
responsibility for nor oversight of the process, 0 8 which may also contribute to
underperformance as measured by legislative and quality-based accountability
standards, unless and until Congress or the courts demanded specific
accountability.
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority may also erode interbranch
transparency. Transferring jurisdiction without explicit legislative consent or
judicial knowledge creates opacity in the process, which then becomes more
difficult to track since it is no longer within the purview of the initial statutory
delegation. This reduction in external awareness of what executive branch
agencies are doing provides cover for agencies to act in unanticipated and
107. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1370-71 (2003) (suggesting, ironically, that only if the government has a significant hand in the private
entity's activities, do constitutional norms apply). Metzger suggests that where the risk of abuse by a
private entity is perhaps greatest because of minimal government involvement, constitutional
accountability is lowest. Id.
108. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing similar principal-agent
problems in both the intra-agency and in arguably more tenable interagency instances in which an
agency retains authority to regulate other agencies).
Yale Journal on Regulation
perhaps unacceptable ways, as suggested by public choice theorists. 0 9 Over
time, the meaningful, substantive influence of those constituencies that are
particularly interested in the administrative adjudication regime at issue may
become limited. Therefore, interagency transfers of adjudication authority may
stymie stakeholders' attempts to check the executive branch, for instance, by
pulling fire alarms that notify Congress of the wayward behavior of the
agencies at issue" °
Further, these transfers may also implicate accountability to legislative
intent unrelated to the quality of the decision-making process. After all,
agencies' various areas of substantive expertise, policy interests, interpretations
of law, ideals of administrative due process, etc. may vary (sometimes greatly)
from one another, and these unique characteristics of agencies certainly factor
into legislative decisions to delegate authority. Therefore, Congress may have
substantive reasons for delegating power to agencies that do not emphasize
efficiency or effectiveness that are underemphasized by the agency to which
the adjudication has been transferred. For instance, there is some evidence that
Treasury may have been the initial delegate of the power to issue notices to
refuse pharmaceutical imports because of its power to bring issues arising in
this context to the attention of the Secretary of HHS,"' an ability that neither
the CBP nor the FDA may have to as great an extent as Treasury.
Legislators may also delegate authority to agencies on the basis of specific
political goals. For example, Treasury may also be relatively politically
conservative or otherwise motivated to apply the statute aggressively or in a
manner preferred by the partisan Congress that passed the legislation in the first
place. Or, Congress may be motivated by an interest in assigning both an
adjudicative and enforcement function to the same agency, a goal that would be
subverted by an agency that transferred its adjudication function but kept its
power to enforce those decisions-for instance, when the CBP transferred its
jurisdiction to refuse illegal pharmaceutical exports, but nonetheless maintained
its authority to enforce those decisions." 2
109. Public choice theorists conceive of "agency policymaking as anti-democratic and
of agencies as shirkers to be reined in by the courts." Freeman & Spence, supra note 106, at 81. In this
view, "agency independence implies a democratic deficit: the elected branches, Congress and the
President (the principals), struggle to control an agency (the agent), whose actions may reflect shirking
and moral hazard." Id. at 64; see also George A. Krause, Legislative Delegation of Authority to
Bureaucratic Agencies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 521-544 (Robert F.
Durant ed., 2010) (discussing related principal-agent problems in the legislature's delegation of
policymaking to the executive branch).
110. See infra note 113.
111. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. There may be benefits to this
separation, see Shah, supra note 2, at 838 (suggesting, in regards to immigration, a "trial-level agency
acting as neutral adjudicator [and] as prosecutor before the appellate agency later in the same
adjudicative process [may] elide[] administrative due process"), but it may nonetheless be counter to
legislative intent underlying the delegation of both forms of authority.
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More generally, Congress may have goals such as the desire to be
responsive to their constituencies, an impulse to empower a friendly agency, or
an intention to gain control over a subcommittee by diverting responsibility in a
targeted manner. 1 3 These aims may lead to the creation of specific policy" 4
that may more successfully realize Congress's favored purposes if agencies do
not divert their delegated power away from themselves." 15 For instance, there is
some evidence that Congress delegated the responsibility to adjudicate Title
VII claims to the EEOC, instead of splitting it, so that the more limited
resources of other, politically favored agencies (such as the OFCCP) would not
be overly burdened." 6 In addition, Congress may wish to "stack the deck" or
otherwise ensure that delegated processes unfold as intended even after the
political make-up of the legislature has changed," I7 an intention that may also
be diluted by an interagency transfer of authority.
113. Scholars have argued that Congress uses a variety of tools to control agency
policymaking: limiting agency discretion through specific language, structuring agencies in ways that
favor particular outcomes, structuring the agency in such a way that it automatically favors particular
interests, engaging in direct oversight by congressional committees, and enabling interest groups to alert
Congress to agency misbehavior by implementing "police patrols" or, arguably less effective in regards
to interagency transfers of adjudication authority, pulling "fire alarms." See JOEL D. ABERBACH,
KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 130-34 (1990) (describing
techniques for oversight, including "use of formal procedures or processes"); Matthew D. McCubbins &
Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 409, 411-
13 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (describing how explicitly specifying
agencies' regulatory scope, instruments, and procedures limits discretion); JR. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2229-30 (2005); Jonathan R. Macey,
Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93,
99-101 (1992); Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
114. That Congress may create policy by committee and through institutionally-
oriented delegation has been fairly well-substantiated in various political science literature. See David
Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political
Science Approach, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 947, 952 (1999); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall,
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as
Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988); see also, e.g., STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING
UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES
(1988); DAVID MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); WALTER OLESZEK ET AL.,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS (10th ed. 2016); STEPHEN S. SMITH, CALL TO
ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE (1989); Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay,
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior,
27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 740 (1983); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation,
Controlled Agencies, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional
Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979).
115. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
YALE L.J. 165,167 (1999).
116. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 1979);
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, Legislative History of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, at 916-17 (Nov. 1972).
117. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast noted:
First, the agency's structure and process should create a political environment that
mirrors the politics at the time of enactment; that is, interests that are active
participants in the debate over the original legislation should be given representation
through the structure and process of the agency so that each will be protected against
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Finally, agencies may feasibly choose to transfer their decision-making
power to further self-interested or political aims that benefit from sidestepping
delegated legislative authority. On the one hand, this may not harm the quality
of administrative adjudication-for instance, if agencies' motivations (such as a
desire to transfer a responsibility to a better-funded agency) align with transfers
that benefit the quality of the process. On the other hand, this may also allow an
agency to redefine its jurisdiction in ways that thwart Congress's ability to
"manipulate its jurisdiction so that it is more or less sensitive to particular
interests."' 8
One way to thwart potential accountability problems would be to require
agencies to issue regulations to concretize interagency transfers of adjudication
power, as in the DHS/DOL H-2B work visa example. This could improve
accountability ex ante by allowing for a notice-and-comment process that may help
agencies to shape their agreement in response to the public's concerns, as well as
ex post by creating a more solid record and an agreement that, by virtue of its
greater accessibility (as compared to an MOU), might be one to which agencies are
more easily held accountable by the public and by courts. There, however, are a
few caveats to this approach. The first, a practical one, notes that there is no
guarantee the public will pay attention to the issuance of rules such as this, or that
the agencies involved will incorporate any suggested changes. The second, more
substantive concern is that the trade-off for gains in accountability will be a loss in
undesirable policy drift .... Second, the structure and process of an agency should
stack the deck in favor of the groups who, among those significantly affected by the
policy, are also favored constituents of the coalition that caused the policy to be
adopted. And third, agency policies should exhibit an autopilot characteristic in the
sense that as the preferences of the constituencies enfranchised in the agency's
structure and procedure change, so too will the agency, freeing Congress and the
President from having to enact new legislation to achieve that end. The implication
of this is not that policy is necessarily stable, but that it will change only to the
extent that either the preferences of the agency's enfranchised constituencies change
or a constituency simply withers away and no longer takes advantage of its
structural and procedural advantages.
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444
(1989); see also Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 261, 264-71 (1987); Pablo T. Spiller & John Ferejohn, The
Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1,
6-7 (1992) (examining how administrative procedures ensure that the agency follows its original
legislative mandate).
118. Nicholas Almendares, Blame-Shifting, Judicial Review, and Public Welfare, 27
J.L. & POL. 239,258 (2012); see also Randall Calvert, Mathew McCubbins & Barry Weingast, A Theory
of Political Control of Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 604 (1989) (finding that the
appointment process, including inter alia "the structuring of the agency itself, the denomination of its
powers and jurisdiction" influences the agency's ultimate policy choices); David B. Spence, Managing
Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law To Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 415-16
(1999) ("[Ploliticians can 'hardwire' the agency in favor of a particular policy perspective through
structural choices, including ... establishing its internal organizational structure, and choosing its
location within the larger executive branch. These choices tend to have an effect on the preferences of
those who come to work within the agency.").
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agencies' ability to respond efficiently to impending needs and crises that create
obstacles to the implementation of adjudication regimes.
3. Due Process
Dynamics in the public/private context suggest also that agencies are
likely to use delegation in order to work around systematic, administrative, and
even constitutional barriers-such as due process-to accomplish "distinct
policy goals that ... would [otherwise] either be legally unattainable or much
more difficult to realize."" 9 Such workarounds constitute a form of executive
aggrandizement. 120 Indeed, in the privatization setting, courts have suggested
that agencies must retain some power or oversight over private actors to ensure
that private entities do not act in self-interested ways that deprive individuals of
rights.' 2'
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority may also burden agencies
with additional agency tasks that impact the quality and transparency of the
process for the individual. For instance, pre-adjudication determinations must
occur prior to the transfer of workplace hazard claims between the DOL and
EPA.'22 Further, the effort of investigating the claim during a pre-adjudication
is wasted because the transferring agency does not use this information to
resolve further process in any way, and the receiving agency has to conduct a
repetitive investigation and establish its own analysis as in order to
adjudicate. 23 In addition to the inefficiency of this process, which requires
agencies to duplicate each other's efforts, the process likely delays the final
adjudication of the claim by either agency. Regardless of whether the claim is
eventually returned to the original agency or completed by the agency to which
it was transferred, the end result is an increase in the adjudication timeline that
affects those seeking resolution of their claims by the agency.
119. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717
(2010).
120. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 515, 517, 571 (2015) (suggesting that a form of executive aggrandizement involves "agency
leaders . . .employing various privatization practices that have the effect of co-opting select public
participants and defanging civil servants," which allows them to "disabl[e] their institutional rivals").
121. See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 215-17 (3d Cir.
2004); Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1455 (2d Cir. 1991); Silverman v.
Barry, 727 F.2d 1121, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d
662,666-67 (4th Cir. 1989); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v.
Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 59 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation
Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 931,
950 (2014).
122. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Labor
Occupational Safety & Health Admin. and the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Enforcement, supra
note 84.
123. See id.
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If, in addition, agencies become careless with or deprioritize values like
transparency, this may lead to structural changes that emphasize short-term
gains over fundamental ideals of high-quality process and democratic
accountability. 24 Because these transfers obscure the adjudication process by
relocating it to another agency via informal agreements that are rather difficult
to trace, they may also provide cover to agencies that purposefully constrain
individual rights protections or other values of administrative procedure in
favor of efficiency, political gain, or bureaucratic goals.
More specifically, agencies might inadequately uphold duties to provide
consistent notice, response, and due process to individual claimants if there is
no oversight or even specific language in the interagency agreement to hold
them accountable. For instance, while the OFCCP is required to provide
claimants with a notice of right-to-sue if the agency rejects a Title VII claim,
there is no specification as to the timing and manner of the notice. 25 In
addition, a handful of courts have acknowledged the potential for substantive
and procedural due process violations resulting from the delegation of Title VII
adjudicatory tasks by the EEOC through MOU. 126 Even if a stakeholder outside
of the executive branch catches an agency's poor decision making, it may be
particularly difficult to improve the quality of the process for various reasons,
including the difficulty of holding the receiving agency accountable to
Congress and the inability of Congress to take the reins nimbly once its original
administrative structure has been warped.
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority may also create obstacles
for those individuals seeking information and consistency in their
administrative law processes, §imilar to and perhaps beyond the challenges
related to due process. For instance, at least one court has suggested that an
individual claimant may be penalized if the OFCCP fails to uphold its duty
under MOU to accept claims on behalf of the EEOC (without any obligation to
adjudicate them on behalf of the EEOC).'2 7 More specifically, a lack of external
recognition regarding which agency has the claim in question and, as such,
knowledge of which stage in the adjudication process the claim is, may plague
those interested in the quality and outcomes of the adjudication throughout the
process.
Overall, these rule of law concerns have the potential to render
interagency transfers of adjudication authority harmful to the quality of
administrative adjudication, and to erode judicial values and expectations
underlying the transfer of certain judicial functions to the executive branch-
124. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open
Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 79, 93 (2012).
125. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n
and the U.S. Dep't of Labor Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs § 7(d)(3) (Nov. 9, 2011).
126. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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values that include transparency and faithful accountability to the law. 128
Indeed, none of the interagency agreements underlying the transfers examined
in this Article specify guidelines that prevent an agency from abusing the
process by simply transferring cases indiscriminately. For instance, the MOU
underlying the transfer of workplace hazard claims between the DOL and EPA
is imprecise enough12 9 to allow for bad-faith agency behavior. Even with the
best of intentions, these agencies may transfer their adjudication authority
without specifying whether and how the recipient agency will uphold the
criteria purportedly set forth in the MOU, and thus, whether the transfer will, in
fact, benefit the adjudication process. 3 ' Further, the language of this or any
interagency agreement may be purposefully vague, for reasons including the
transferring agency's hopes that the recipient agency will come to grow in its
relevant expertise... and thus take responsibility for the entire set of
adjudications over time.
B. Functional Benefits
Having explored potential drawbacks of interagency transfers of
adjudication authority, this Part now considers how these transfers may
improve the quality of agency decision making if agencies can draw on them to
"adapt[] to changed conditions[] and realiz[e] new policy goods.' 32 As noted
throughout this Article, interagency transfers of adjudication authority may be
driven by an agency's self-interest in shifting its adjudicatory responsibility to
an agency with which it has an ongoing relationship' 33-for instance, for
purposes of convenience and efficiency, or even to avoid the expenditure of
bureaucratic resources and accountability for the process. These agreements
may also be based on the genuine desire to increase the quality of the
adjudication process. Importantly, these two sets of aims are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Even if agencies make these arrangements for the "wrong"
reasons or not in keeping with the public's expectations, interagency transfers
of adjudication authority may nonetheless benefit the quality of administrative
decision making.
An agency could feasibly be motivated by self-interest to make an
interagency transfer of adjudication authority that also benefits the quality of
128. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1727 (2010).
129. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text.
130. See id.
131. Gersen, supra note 12 at 213-15.
132. Huq, supra note 18, at 1618, 1686 (arguing that "dynamic interaction between
institutions creates many opportunities for bargains over institutional allocations" and that such "deals
are often (if not always) a desirable means of resolving constitutional ambiguities, adapting to changed
conditions, and realizing new policy goods").
133. See supra notes 46, 55, 56, 66, 79 and accompanying text.
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the adjudication. For example, if Treasury wishes to transfer its authority to
adjudicate the legality of pharmaceutical imports due to claims of a comparable
lack of relevant resources, nationwide presence, or leadership bandwidth, then
transferring adjudication authority to an agency with more of these or other
related resources, like the FDA, would both satisfy Treasury's self-interest and
benefit the affected processes. Indeed, transfers such as these may allow
agencies to act based on their self-interest as well as on-the-ground information
identifying agencies better qualified to house a particular administrative
decision-making process than the one to which Congress originally delegated
the decision-making authority.
1. "Primarily Responsible" Agency
Agency decision making is generally better if there is an entity that is
responsible for it.134 However, the opportunity for adequate agency oversight of
most forms of coordinated interagency adjudication is limited due to the
extensively decentralized nature 135 of administrative adjudication. One potential
benefit of interagency transfers of adjudication authority is the extent to which
they allow for the emergence of a responsible agency that is able to oversee and
ensure the quality of the process.
Even in the intra-agency context, administrative adjudication is fairly
decentralized, at least more so than rulemaking. 3 6 Interagency coordination, for
the most part, decentralizes adjudication processes even further by extending
the delegation of adjudicatory tasks to multiple bureaucrats housed in separate
agencies. 137 Further, the influence of bureaucrats from different agencies brings
with it varying views, loyalties, and interests that may diverge from those of the
agency or agencies adjudicating the final claim, more so than do the interests of
bureaucrats tasked to further an adjudication process from within the same
agency.
134. See Christopher B. McNeil, Executive Branch Adjudications in Public Safety
Laws: Assessing the Costs and Identifying the Benefits of ALJ Utilization in Public Safety Legislation,
38 IND. L. REV. 435, 472 (2005) (suggesting that specialized ALJs improve agency decision making);
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 204
(2001) (suggesting that the quality of decentralized forms of administrative action turn on this "feature
of agency process, traditionally ignored in administrative law doctrine and scholarship-that is, the
position in the agency hierarchy of the person assuming responsibility for the administrative decision").
135. Shah, supra note 2, at 878-79. Note that coordination and centralization are not
the same thing. For instance, a process can be centralized in one agency, which directs and is primarily
responsible for the quality of the process, while benefiting from coordination ensuring that other
agencies' resources or expertise have a positive impact on the process. While the relationship between
agency coordination and decentralization is not well documented, I am not the first to consider
"decentralized coordination" among agencies. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and
Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 943, 948 (2003) (considering the idea that agencies could
solve myriad social problems by means of "decentralized coordination").
136. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1068, 1075 (arguing that
administrative adjudication is decentralized).
137. See Shah, supra note 2 1, at 832, 860.
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Because of the decentralized nature of many coordinated interagency
adjudication processes, an agency may shirk some of its duties in any given
adjudicative process, either by passing them to another agency ad hoc, or by
lowering its commitment to its delegated tasks in a way that requires another
agency to pick up the slack. However, this agency also retains its apparent
authority. This dynamic, in turn, may dilute the actual responsibility of the
shirking official or agency to the process, and contribute to inconsistent
interagency communication, conflicts of interest, and the likelihood of error. 38
Since the multiple agencies involved in these processes are not in strictly
vertical relationships with one another, not negotiating how best to parcel out
authority shared under the same agency roof, and not subject to a consistent
system of checks,' 39 there is no one obvious agency overseer to ensure each
agency in the process maintains certain standards.
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority, however, establish and
maintain greater process centrality than do other forms of coordinated
interagency adjudication. They do so by allowing an agency to transfer a
process in its entirety to another agency. These agreements also memorialize
and make somewhat more formal the ways in which agencies might burden-
shift, which can increase the independence of the recipient agency because the
agency need not engage in long-term "bargaining" or compromise solutions
required in other forms of interagency negotiation. Further, the recipient agency
may approach its duties with a heightened sense of responsibility in order to
benefit in the future as the result of more collaborative arrangements. 40 Thus,
these transfers create opportunities to sustain or reestablish responsibility for a
process in the agency to which power has been transferred.
Indeed, a broad statutory basis for agency coordination-and in particular,
for the transfer of jurisdiction -may even help reduce agencies' impulses to
shirk their decision-making responsibility.14' Further, in interagency transfers
of authority, once an agency has transferred the authority to adjudicate a claim
fully into the hands of another agency and recentralized the process, there are
138. See Shah, supra note 21.
139. In rulemaking, multi-agency processes may "increase the reliability of
bureaucratic performance" by providing "for monitoring and reporting of agent behavior by competing
agents themselves." See Gersen, supra note 12, at 214 (2006). However, in many forms of coordinated
interagency adjudication, there is often "no entity to which to report problematic agency behavior,
especially in ad hoc procedures .... " Shah, supra note 2, at 849.
140. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
141. "If Congress wants to take advantage of agency knowledge, but is concerned that
agencies will shirk and fail to invest heavily enough in the development of expertise," allowing for the
manipulation of jurisdiction per Gersen's suggestion-but by agencies themselves -could help manage
that possibility. Gersen, supra note 21, at 712; see also supra note 144. Gersen and others discuss the
potential for Congress to manipulate agency jurisdiction, but allowing agencies to do so themselves
might help accomplish the same goals without requiring Congress to develop and oversee the structural
changes itself. By allowing agencies to take advantage of vague statutory authority in order to burden-
shift, interagency transfers of adjudication authority thwart the legislative expectation that agency self-
manipulation of jurisdiction will, as Gersen puts it, limit agencies' "shirk[ing] and fail[urel to invest
heavily" in the implementation of an administrative adjudication regime. Id.
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theoretically no more opportunities to burden-shift on the sly. Admittedly, in
practice, certain transfers may allow shirking on the basis of vague or
incomplete guidelines, potential pitfalls in communication, and the negative
impact on due process that may accompany the back and forth movement of a
number of claims. However, this could be cured by more explicit agreements,
which other forms of coordinated adjudication do not have the option to draft.
For instance, although the authority to refuse illegal pharmaceutical
exports was passed from agency to agency (Treasury to the CBP to the FDA), it
was eventually housed in the FDA,'42 which is in fact fully responsible for the
quality of these decisions and has an unencumbered opportunity to oversee this
process nationwide (a task at which it is particularly adept). Or, in regards to
the transfer of Title VII claims: if the OFCCP has been granted the authority to
adjudicate any given Title VII case on behalf of the EEOC, it need not (and
should not expect to) rely on the EEOC to ensure the quality of the process and
resulting decision, as it had in the past. 14 3 Nor can it shirk responsibility to the
claimant, for instance, to properly transfer the claim to the proper
adjudicator, 44 as easily as it might in cases where the EEOC maintains even
apparent responsibility for the process. 4 5 Even in an instance which
responsibilities are consolidated, agencies may be empowered to take control
over matters they would otherwise have marked as outside their control. To
take another example, the teaming up of OSHA and the EPA in handling
workplace hazard adjudications, including with some amount of bartering to
consolidate and share their responsibilities in order to make them more
manageable for both agencies, may not only foster administrative efficiency but
also improve the quality of decision making by increasing the bandwidth of
each agency.
2. Agency Expertise
Interagency transfers of adjudication authority may also increase the level
of expertise ultimately brought to bear in a set of adjudications by allowing
agencies to transfer jurisdiction to those with greater substantive and procedural
expertise, including those that have acquired this over time. 14 6 Expertise may
include, for instance, a greater facility with fact-finding and related
investigation, with the application of policy to initial-level decision making, or
even with how best to maintain a consistent, nationwide system of
142. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
145. See id.; see generally, Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 903 (8th
Cir. 1979).
146. See Gersen, supra note 12, at 213-15 (noting that agency expertise can change
over time). Even the primary agency to which Congress may have delegated the authority to interpret a
statute or some other function need not be or remain the most expert in either that statute or function.
See id.
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administrative decision making. For instance, the EEOC may be interested in
transferring Title VII claims to the OFCCP to take advantage of its growing
expertise (at least as related to federal contractors) in these types of claims.147
In regards to the evaluation of pharmaceutical imports and exports, the decision
to delegate final responsibility to the FDA was based on the recognition that the
FDA has the most focused expertise in the matter at hand, including a national
presence and depth of knowledge. 48 Further, the transfer of Radiation Control
for Health and Safety Act claims from the CBP to another agency, perhaps one
with greater expertise in this arena, makes some sense (notwithstanding the fact
that the FDA may not be that ideal agency).
Further, these agreements allow agencies to put their heads together in
order to come up with a more effective decision-making regime than Congress
may have effected through the transferring agency. Shared delegation may not
only help avoid the cost of "creating a new agency to address multiple
issues," '' but could also mean the ultimate outcome the two agencies reach
may be less biased 5 ° and "closer to the outcome lawmakers would negotiate if
they were to bargain among themselves than would occur if the original agency
possessed all of the authority."'' In these ways, transfers may also serve to
increase agency expertise in any given adjudication regime, when Congress's
initial delegation may not have done so as effectively. One caveat to this theory
is that agency expertise may be brought to bear-if not in equal measure, then
at least to a useful degree-without an agency transferring its decision-making
jurisdiction entirely. That having been said, it is more difficult to ensure the
consistent influence of expertise on those processes in which agencies consult
with or seek information from other entities ad hoc.
3. Ameliorating Coalitional Drift
One more way in which interagency transfers of adjudication authority
may serve administrative interests is by allowing agencies to guard against
coalitional drift in those circumstances in which an agency is pulled towards
the partisan preferences of future legislatures and away from the substantive
goals of its enacting Congress. 52 More specifically, these transfers serve to
147. See, e.g., supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
148. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Customs Serv. and the
Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 14, 1979); Shah, supra note 2, at 29-30.
149. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1142.
150. See generally Robert Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance:
The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L. 1 (2007) (suggesting that "intersystemic"
governance may also reduce biases in the application of law).
151. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1142.
152. See Renan, supra note 12, at 258 ("Coalitional drift is the difference between the
policy preferences of the enacting Congress and the policy preferences of a future Congress."); see also
Macey, supra note 113, at 94 ("[Blecause of shifting preferences, monitoring by subsequent political
coalitions will not be a reliable tool for protecting previously obtained political gains.").
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increase bureaucratic drift from,153 and thus to dilute the impact of, overly-
politicized future legislatures. 54 To be clear, this subsection does not argue in
favor of enacting legislative coalitions over contemporary coalitions as a
general matter.155 Rather, it argues that agencies should have the opportunity to
push back against contemporary coalitions that seek to limit their
effectiveness- in particular, through budget cuts-for unprincipled reasons. As
many have suggested, bureaucratic drift occurs when policy implemented by
agencies differs from ongoing legislative preferences. 56 The common story
about bureaucratic drift is that it is to be avoided by ensuring as much
legislative control of agencies' structural dynamics as possible. 57 What this
perspective neglects, however, is the extent to which "political institutions are
also weapons of coercion and redistribution ... the structural means by which
political winners pursue their own interests, often at the great expense of
political losers.' 58
153. This idea is complementary to the theory that coalitions that put procedures in
place to control bureaucratic drift leave themselves open to coalitional drift. See Murray J. Horn &
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies": Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs,
75 VA. L. REV. 499, 501-04 (1989);
154. See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making:
Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407 (1997) (hypothesizing that
agencies are dominated by powerful congressional committees, with the result that agency policy
reflects the preferences of current legislative committees, as opposed to the preferences of the enacting
Congress).
155. Engaging in this large debate is beyond this Article's scope, although it is worth
noting briefly that scholars have argued successfully in favor of contemporary coalitions. See, e.g., Einer
R. Elhauge, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: How To INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008); Oona
A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140,
202-03 (2009) (noting that when "a President has entered a binding executive agreement with another
nation, the last-in-time rule applies so that a conflicting law enacted by Congress ... after the conclusion
of the agreement renders the agreement invalid under domestic law").
156. See, e.g., Horn & Shepsle, supra note 153, at 501-02; see also Renan, supra note
12, at 257.
157. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 113, at 100 (explaining that agency design can be
used to minimize "bureaucratic drift" and that "the politicians who create administrative agencies can
limit future agency costs not only by establishing procedural and substantive rules under which such
agencies must operate, but also through the initial organizational design of the agency itself"); Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 111, 113-15 (1992); Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247,
279 (2007) (describing bureaucratic drift as a "risk" and a "threat"); Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in
Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 109,
126 (referring to bureaucratic drift as a "problem"); McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, supra note 117, at 273-74 (elected politicians should use administrative
procedures in addition to or instead of monitoring and sanctions to achieve bureaucratic compliance);
Renan, supra note 12, at 259 ("Through a mix of structural and procedural controls enacted in
legislation, the argument goes, Congress ameliorates bureaucratic drift." (emphasis added)).
158. Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 213, 213 (1990); see also Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, The
Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1651, 1710 (A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Stephen Shavel eds., 2007); Macey, supra note 113, at 94 (defining bureaucratic drift as "elected
officials' concern that administrative agencies will act in ways contrary to their interests[,] [which]
prompts them to develop complex rules to control the future conduct of agencies").
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One potential response to this theory is that agencies should be duly
managed by legislatures over time, and that appropriations decisions are one
way to do so.'5 9 Put another way, for instance, "congressional investigations
into the performance of an agency may take place through annual budgetary
process, the reauthorization of an agency's programs, and watchdog agencies
such as the Office of Management and Budget and the General Accounting
Office."' 16' But overseeing an agency's performance in order to make
substantive changes that benefit bureaucratic effectiveness 16 1 (even in order to
pacify powerful stakeholders), and hamstringing an agency based on political
motives symbolize two separate types of legislative values. This Article
privileges the former. Congress should step out from behind appropriations
decisions and voice, by means of an explicit change to statute,' 62 its intention to
handicap an agency.
Arguably, privileging substantive statutes over appropriations legislation
does not increase accountability and transparency either. For instance, given the
more stringent requirements of enacting legislation to curtail executive branch
actions, appropriations bills may serve as a mechanism for ensuring
majoritarian accountability. 163 However, in instances where Congress uses
appropriations decisions to cripple agency effectiveness in the pursuit of
political aims, agencies are justified in seeking ways to push back in order to
continue to fulfill their substantive core directives as effectively as possible.
Further, an ideal shared by the legislative and executive branches is "to
ensure that administrative agencies generate outcomes that are consistent with
the original [legislative] understanding.' ' 164 Given the widely-held theory that
legislative delegation to agencies can cause bureaucratic drift, 65 arguably,
taking control of administrative structure via a systematic and coherent form of
agency re-delegation in the face of turnover in the legislature can be a means
for agencies to withstand the perversions of subsequent legislatures proactively
159. See David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Political Control and the Forms of
Agency Independence, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2015) ("Agency executives that run afoul of
Congress can be hauled before unfriendly committees, have their budgets cut, and be shackled with a
variety of constraints on agency activities and spending.").
160. Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of
War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 672 n.2 (1992); see also McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process, supra note 117, at 434.
161. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,
supra note 117, at 273-74 (suggesting that elected politicians should use administrative procedures in
addition to or instead of monitoring and sanctions to achieve bureaucratic compliance).
162. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and
Moderation?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 334 (2013); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 935 (2008) ("A future legislature might
amend or repeal the statute once control of the legislature shifts.").
163. I would like to thank Gillian Metzger for this insight.
164. Macey, supra note 160, at 671-72.
165. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 157, at 282 (2007); Cary Coglianese, Empirical
Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2002).
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in order to circle back to the core, substantive institutional mandates 66 assigned
to the agency by the Congress that enacted the administrative adjudication
program.
1 67
One hypothesis in this vein is that interagency transfers of adjudication
authority may allow an agency to work around instances in which it would
otherwise have to shirk its responsibilities because of recent limitations in
resources designated to an agency. Examples of this might include cases where
Congress has begun to reduce funding to an agency for political reasons, to
divert money elsewhere in response to newly influential lobbyists, or as
punishment (unrelated, perhaps, to the importance of the administrative
mandate that Congress has decided to defund), but has nonetheless continued to
vest in the agency the responsibility to implement the original adjudication
regime. For example, there is some evidence that Congress has limited EEOC
funding for the implementation of an effective Title VII regime. By transferring
a set of adjudications to the OFCCP-an entity that Congress itself once
determined has a similar mandate to the EEOC 161 -the EEOC is able to better
implement its Title VII directive and to alleviate coalitional drift. This may be
the case especially to the extent that enabling legislation does not clearly stack
the deck169 _for instance, in this case, when a later Congress's appropriations
decision reduces the EEOC's ability to fulfill its original legislative mandate.
Overall, whether these transfers of adjudication authority are initiated in
order to conserve resources, to further seemingly more efficient and expert
administrative decision-making processes, or to respond to bureaucratic stasis
and legislative pressure, the dynamic is one that may hold promise, in some
cases, for better administrative decision-making arrangements. That having
been said, additional information is required to determine whether and how
interagency transfers of adjudication authority impact the quality of
administrative decision making-including whether an evolution in the detail
166. See Moe, supra note 158, at 230 ("Structural items can be traded for policy items,
and vice versa .... In the resulting package, the agency gets a structure and a mandate, but the former is
not designed or adopted because it is a means to the latter.").
167. It is worth noting that few have considered the influence of interagency
interactions on this dynamic, and that no one thus far has considered the impact of the interagency
transfer of decision-making power on bureaucratic or coalitional drift. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 12, at
259 (discussing the impact of agencies sharing their resources on bureaucratic drift); see generally
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1.
168. See supra note 7.
169. This idea is encapsulated by scholarship that criticizes McNollgast's seminal
theory ("[b]y structuring who gets to make what decisions when, as well as by establishing the process
by which those decisions are made, the details of enabling legislation can stack the deck in an agency's
decision-making") by suggesting that enabling legislation does not necessarily clear a path free of
coalition drift. Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, supra note 158; but see, e.g.,
Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POL. SCI
REV. 663, 671 (1998); Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies": Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 484
(1989); Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante, supra note 116, at 415; Michael Asimow, On Pressing
McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory Costs, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at
127,131.
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and quality of the agreements themselves or proactive oversight might change
their impact. As such, this Part opens the door to additional analysis of these
arrangements and related dynamics.
III. Establishing Legitimate Authority
"Administrative law, at root, is the process by which otherwise-
unencumbered agency officials are legally and politically constrained in an
effort to prevent abuse and to confer legitimacy on the power that is
exercised."'170 Whether or not their actions benefit the quality of public law,
agencies, like the rest of the executive branch, may act only when suitably
authorized 171 and checked. 72 Even if interagency transfers of adjudication
authority benefit the quality of administrative decision making, this does not
necessarily mean agencies have the power to make those transfers legitimately,
in keeping with separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine.
This Part explores various ways in which agencies might establish proper
authority for interagency transfers of adjudication authority, given that
Congress has never explicitly given agencies the power to transfer their entire
jurisdiction to adjudicate decisions in any area of administrative law. After
arguing that these transfers are not part and parcel of power inherent to the
executive branch to delegate within a single agency, it determines that these
transfers are only valid if agencies can find mooring for the transfers in statute.
Finally, this Part settles on legislative delegations to agencies of authority to
coordinate with other agencies as a legitimate source of power for these
interagency arrangements.
A. Unsatisfying Sources of Authority
The specific question explored in this subsection is whether agencies have
thus far drawn from legitimate authority in transferring their decision-making
power. To further its inquiry, it examines how interagency transfers of
170. See Jon D. Michaels, supra note 120, at 532; Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian
Separation of Powers, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 1006, 1033 (2014) (suggesting that institutional
innovations are intolerable if they cause the executive to "fundamentally aggrandize itself").
171. Only Congress or an authorized interpretation of the constitution may empower
the executive branch to act. Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 240 (suggesting that the "executive branch ...may act only pursuant to
authority given by legislation or an enumerated constitutional power");. see also JACK GOLDSMITH,
POWER AND CONSTRAINT 207-08 (2012); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1688, 1707-20, 1731-32 (2011).
172. This tension has roots in the counterefficiency theory, which suggests that the
protection of the separation of powers may require limiting the efficiency of governmental processes.
See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 301, 303 (1989) ("Justice Brandeis' oft-quoted version of separation of powers elevated
the counterefficiency argument to the status of dominating principle when he said that the purpose of
separation of powers was 'not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."'
(discussing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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adjudication authority are both similar to and unique among ways in which
agencies more commonly delegate partial authority to one another. This
subsection's exploration of the constitutionality of these interagency transfers
also contributes to the very limited body of work examining structural
constitutional issues arising from agency coordination.'7 3
1. Intra-Agency Delegation Power
Generally, Congress is the branch of government empowered to structure
administrative authority.174 However, intra-agency adjudication processes often
involve extra-statutory delegation initiated by bureaucrats. Indeed, initial
delegations of authority to interpret statutes are given to the agency's "statutory
delegatee," often a political appointee.175 And yet, Congress certainly does not
expect busy executive branch leaders such as the Attorney General or Secretary
of HHS to carry out the delegated responsibilities him- or herself. 76 These
duties, thus, are subdelegated further-often automatically and en masse-to
173. Freeman and Rossi have noted that agency coordination (namely, within
rulemaking) may have implications for the separation of powers doctrine, but none, thus far, have
explored those implications. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1137; cf. Jon D. Michaels,
Separation of Powers and Centripetal Forces: Implications for the Institutional Design and
Constitutionality of Our National-Security State, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 199, 199 (2016) (noting that the
"concentrat[ion] and consolidat[ion]" of entities across the "the public-private divide, the federal-state
divide, and the political-civil servant divide within government agencies" should be more closely
examined "for reasons pertaining to constitutional separation of powers"). This exploration is useful,
given the traditional assumption in the literature of a monolithic government. See Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 579, 581-82 (1984) ("Once one descends below the level of the branch heads named in the
Constitution -Congress, President, and Supreme Court-separation of powers ceases to have
descriptive power."); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) ("The first-best concept of 'legislature v.
executive' checks and balances must be updated to contemplate second-best 'executive v. executive'
divisions."). More recently, some have come to describe the elements of intra-branch administrative
design as an "internal separation of powers" within the executive branch. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note
120; Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of
Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009). The literature also "demands a separation of powers doctrine
recognizing a fourth coordinate branch of constitutional government." Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced
Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 719 (1997). As such, it has also begun to
acknowledge the influence of individual executive agencies. See, e.g., Viktoria Lovei, Revealing the
True Definition of APA § 701(a)(2) by Reconciling "No Law to Apply" with the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2006) (noting that "many federal agencies operate as
miniature versions of the tripartite federal government, with the authority to legislate (through
rulemaking), adjudicate (through administrative hearings), and execute agency policies (through agency
enforcement) [and] this unique structure raises separation of powers concerns."); Ganesh Sitaraman,
Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 502 (2014); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts
on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1392 (1992).
174. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1183 (1992);
Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 891 (2012).
175. Barron & Kagan, supra note 134, at 245.
176. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 430-51
(2015).
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mid- and lower-level adjudicators, including but not limited to administrative
law judges.'77
Once the statutory delegatee transfers an intra-agency adjudication to, for
instance, the mid-level adjudicator, the decision-making process is for the most
part spearheaded by that adjudicator (who is both insulated from and
accountable to the initial political appointee). However, the adjudicator may
also further delegate parts of the adjudication process to others. Further, a civil
servant out in the field or an enforcement-minded group of bureaucrats may
investigate or fact-find for the adjudicator, help determine the relevant statutory
application to assist the adjudicator, or resolve portions of the adjudication at
hand in place of the adjudicator.
Yet, despite the extent of intra-agency delegation, it uncertain whether
agencies may transfer their adjudication authority across agency borders, "in
the absence of congressional authorization,' 75 even to accomplish similar
administrative goals. Along these same lines, it is also unclear whether
agencies have the power to separate their adjudicative and enforcement
functions when Congress has purposefully delegated both to the same agencies,
even if there are benefits to the separation . 79 Further, while coordinated
interagency adjudication may involve agencies delegating tasks to one another
of their own volition, 80 courts have thus far taken a stance against the idea that
these arrangements are part of agencies' intrinsic executive authority by
distinguishing them from intra-agency delegation.
More specifically, the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have determined
that agencies have the authority to delegate internally absent congressional
language authorizing the coordination, but that delegation to an "outside party,"
which includes delegation from one agency to another agency at the same level
of government, is impermissible as an exercise of purely executive power.'
81
177. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation
Doctrine, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163,213-14 (2013); Barron & Kagan, supra note 134.
178. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers
Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1268 (1988) (focusing on administrative adjudication).
179. See supra note 112.
180. In an antitrust example based in interagency agreement alone, DOJ and the
Department of Transportation collaborate, under MOUs, to decide whether to accept air transport
mergers. See State of American Aviation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on
Transp. & Infrastructure, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Susan L. Kurland, Assistant Secretary for
Aviation & International Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Transp.), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113shrg88515/html/CHRG-l1 3shrg88515.htm. Although DOJ usually has authority over antitrust
controversies, here the agencies work together to determine whether airline mergers will violate antitrust
laws because of the DOT's obvious expertise in airline safety and security. See id. Agencies may also
informally share tasks with or delegate tasks to one another in order to increase the capacity of both
agencies involved. See generally Renan, supra note 12.
181. "While courts have generally adopted a presumption that interprets statutory
silences in favor of subdelegation [or intra-agency delegation,] in the absence of clear congressional
language, interagency redelegation is presumptively barred." Jason Marisam, The Interagency
Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 893-97 (2012); see also, ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484
U.S. 495, 517 (1988) (articulating that "the Executive Branch is not permitted to administer the
[delegating statute] in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress
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This means that while intra-agency delegation may be accepted as part and
parcel of agencies' executive branch powers regardless of underlying statutory
authority, interagency delegation has not been similarly understood thus far.18 2
Because interagency transfers of adjudication do not involve the more ordinary
act of delegating discrete tasks, but rather, consist of wholesale transfers of
adjudicative power, courts are perhaps even less likely to accept an interagency
transfer of adjudication authority as a permissible manner in which agencies
may instigate changes to administrative structure.
This inquiry is further complicated by the fact that by transferring
authority wholesale, interagency transfers of adjudication authority allow
agencies to determine and restructure the boundaries of their jurisdiction by
themselves, which may also be impermissible as an independent exercise of
executive power. In general, the courts are empowered to constrain agencies'
self-definition of jurisdiction, particularly in regards to administrative
adjudication. 83 Further, there is perhaps a set of adjudicative jurisdictional
determinations that agencies may never make for themselves.'84 This may
include agencies defining their own authority under super-statues'85 and
jurisdiction under Administrative Procedure Act itself.'86
While the Supreme Court recently decided, in City of Arlington v. FCC,
that agencies may be granted Chevron deference to negotiate the scope of their
own authority in some instances, it also determined that this is constitutionally
permissible only as long agencies act "based on a permissible construction of
the statute."' 87 Further, a vocal minority of the Court made clear the concern
enacted into law"); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("When a statute
delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or
agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent. But
the cases recognize an important distinction between subdelegation to a subordinate and [re]delegation
to an outside party . . . . There is no such presumption covering [reldelegations to outside parties.");
Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775,783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
182. This is the case even though the constitutional distinction between intra-agency
and interagency delegation to adjudicators is particularly unclear, given that adjudicators have
protections against removal in either scenario. (I would like to thank Gillian Metzger for this insight.).
183. Thomas W. Merrill, Article 111, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 943 (2011) (noting that the
Supreme Court decision that is most often credited with the rise of the current scheme of appellative
review of administrative adjudication, Crowell v. Benson, determined that Article III is satisfied only "as
long as all questions of law and key 'jurisdictional' facts are subject to de novo review by an Article III
court").
184. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (concretizing the transition ofjudicial functions to the executive branch, which defined "jurisdictional" to mean "[in relation to
administrative agencies, the question in a given case is whether it falls within the scope of the authority
validly conferred").
185. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50
DUKE L. J. 1215 (2001).
186. See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 347, 348 (2003) ("[Tihere is a set of interpretive questions as to which the agency's views are
irrelevant, except to the extent that any litigant's views are considered; an example is the interpretation
of the Administrative Procedure Act itself.").
187. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
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that agencies may be accumulating too much power if allowed to determine
their own jurisdiction under any circumstances. 188 This case implies, at least,
that when agencies transfer their decision-making jurisdiction to other agencies,
they are in danger of overstepping the proper bounds of executive power unless
moored in legislation. The majority's recent decision confirming the
constitutionality of Obamacare echoed this sentiment by reflecting the view of
the dissent in City of Arlington that agencies should not be allowed to define
their own jurisdiction.'89
2. The Economy Act
In at least one interagency transfer of adjudication authority, agencies use
the Economy Act' 9° as authority for their agreements. 19' The purpose of the
legislation is "to permit the utilization of facilities and personnel belonging to
one department by another department or establishment and to enact a simple
and uniform procedure for effecting the appropriation adjustments involved."' 92
Indeed, the Economy Act is arguably the foundation of the "interagency
marketplace"' 9 3 because it encompasses myriad ways in which agencies may
trade competencies. 9 Further, the "Act was designed to address intra-
executive outsourcing, and so its constraints generally focus on the transfer of
funds or legal authority from one agency to another."' 95
Legislative history shows that Congress drafted this vague, broadly
applicable statute in order to provide agencies leeway to interact (and
eventually, to coordinate), because it believed that this could be useful for the
implementation of a variety of legislative interests.' 96 Further, the Government
188. See id.
189. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (striking down the IRS's efforts to
define its own jurisdiction); supra note 187 and accompanying text.
190. Economy Act, 47 Stat. 382 (1932) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1535
(2012)).
191. See, e.g., supra note 62 (noting that the transfer of authority from the CBP to the
FDA to determine claims under the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act claims authority from
the 1932 Economy Act, as well as another broad statute, the Public Health Service Act).
192. Hearings on H.R. 10199 Before the Comm. on Expenditures in the Exec.
Departments, 71st Cong. 3 (1930), reprinted in 57 COMP. GEN. 674,678 (1978).
193. Marisam, supra note 174, at 887.
194. See id. at 887-88 (suggesting that "by allowing agencies to obtain services from
each other in exchange for money, the Act lets agencies tap into each other's expertise and infrastructure
[and that] the Act allows agencies to save money by hiring other, more efficient agencies to perform
tasks for them."); Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State,
95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 583 (2010) (arguing for the "need to recognize coordination as an increasingly
important impetus for regulatory action").
195. See Renan, supra note 12, at 266.
196. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 71-2201, at 2-3, quoted in 57 COMP. GEN., at 674 (1978)
("Very substantial economies can be realized by one department availing itself of the equipment and
services of another department in proper cases. A free interchange of work as contemplated by this bill
will enable all bureaus and activities of the Government to be utilized to their fullest and in many cases
make it unnecessary for departments to set up duplicating and overlapping activities on [their] own.").
Indeed, while an "outsourcing agency cannot use an Economy Act agreement to fund work that it would
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Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that "the objective of the statute is to
permit an agency to take advantage of another agency's experience or
expertise,' 97 which is a primary benefit of interagency transfers of adjudication
authority.' 9 The GAO has also determined that agencies themselves should be
able to decide whether they are qualified to enter into Economy Act
agreements' 9 9 and that they must be written, 20 0 both of which are cornerstones
of interagency transfers of adjudication authority. However, while the
Economy Act promotes interagency coordination, it also establishes a
"comprehensive set of procedures and rules that constrain exchanges in the
interagency marketplace. ' ' 20 1 For one, the goal of the Act does not include
providing opportunities for agencies "merely to 'dump' either work or funds or
to avoid legislative restrictions. 2 o2
Overall, the Act does not appear to have contemplated the types of
exchanges created by interagency transfers of adjudication authority. For
instance, the establishment of a fair exchange of funds is a primary focus of the
Act 20 3 as well as many paradigm agreements based on the Act. 20 4 A particular
not itself be authorized to undertake [n]or can the outsourcing agency obtain under the Economy Act
services from another agency that its own enabling statute prohibits," this implies that the agency can
outsource any number of tasks that has been charged with accomplishing itself. Renan, supra note 12, at
266.
197. See 3 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-08-987SP, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law 12-27 & 12-46 (3d ed. 2008) http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf (citing
23 COMP. GEN. 935, 937-38 (1944)) [hereinafter GAO Red Book].
198. See supra note 146-151 and accompanying text.
199. See GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-28.
200. An Economy Act transfer should be anchored in a "written order or agreement in
advance, signed by the responsible administrative officer of each of the departments or offices
concerned." 13 COMP. GEN. 234, 237 (1934). "A written agreement is important because, as in any
contract situation, the terms to which the parties agree, as reflected in the writing, establish the scope of
the undertaking and the rights and obligations of the parties." GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-30.
201. See Marisam, supra note 174.
202. GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-27. Specifically, there must be an
"absence of any statutory prohibitions or restrictions which would obstruct performance." GAO Red
Book, supra note 197, at 12-28.
203. Much of the language of the Act focuses on appropriations. See generally, 31
U.S.C. § 1535. Further, Congress specified that proper appropriations reimbursement was an important
factor motivating the passage of this bill. See H.R. REP. NO. 71-2201, at 2-3 (1931), quoted in 57 CoMP.
GEN., at 674 (1978) ("Heretofore the cost of such services as have been performed by one department
for another has frequently been paid for out of the appropriations for the department furnishing the
materials and services. This is unfair to the department doing the work. All materials furnished and work
done should be paid for by the department requiring such materials and services . . . . [The bill's
funding provisions] will hold each department to strict accountability for its own expenditures and result
in more satisfactory budgeting and accounting."); see also, GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-30
to -43 (focusing on the importance of fiscal matters and costs to Economy Act agreements).
204. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Economy Act for Purchasing Goods or Services,
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/mou-economyact.pdf; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Determination and Findings (D&F) for an Interagency Acquisition Under the Economy Act FAR
17.502-2, http://corpslakes.usace.army.mil/partners/pdfs/NWD%2022-
15%20Economy%2OAct%20DF%20templates%202016.pdf; U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Financial Management Services, Interagency Agreement-Agreement between Federal Agencies,
http://corpslakes.usace.army.mil/partners/pdfs/Form%207600%2OIAA-General-Terms-Conditions.pdf;
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concern is lowering cost for the outsourcing agency 20 5 and ensuring the proper
de-obligation of appropriations for the agency performing the task,20 6 for
services such as interagency details of personnel 2 7 and the provision of raw
materials. 20 8 This emphasis on cost is not reflected in any of the interagency
transfers of adjudication authority agreements discussed in this Article, as none
of them mention a payment structure, include a cost-benefit analysis of any sort
(let alone one that establishes the monetary benefits of the transfer to the
government), or discuss appropriations in any meaningful way. Of course, it is
possible that the implicit interest in reducing costs that may drive agencies to
initiate transfers of their adjudicative authority has basis in these Economy Act
provisions.
Perhaps more importantly, "an agency may not transfer administrative
functions to another agency under the aegis of the Economy Act. 20 9 While the
GAO admits that "[t]he difficulty in applying the rule is that no one has ever
attempted to define the admittedly vague term 'administrative function' in this
particular context," it nonetheless asserts that the Economy Act "prohibit[s]
transfer of an entire appropriation, 21 0 in particular, those "functions with
respect to which an agency has authority to make 'final and conclusive'
determinations. 211 A crucial matter is that the outsourcing agency should retain
"ultimate control" over the transferred function.21 2 A similar reading of the Act
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/Northwestern Division, Determination of Best Procurement Approach,
http://corpslakes.usace.army .mil/partners/pdfs/NWD%2022-
15%20Economy%20Act%20DBPA%20templates%202016.pdf. For additional templates, see Economy
Act Sample Templates at http://corpslakes.usace.army.mil/partners/economy-templates.cfm.
205. See, e.g., GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-29 (suggesting "that agencies
document the two determinations called for by [the Economy Act,] 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535(a)(2) and (a)(4)
(interest of the government and lower cost)").
206. See, e.g., id. at 12-43 to -46.
207. See id. at 12-54 to -59.
208. See id. at 12-59 to -62.
209. Id. at 12-70; see also Civ. Serv. Comm'n, B-45488, at 3 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 11,
1944) ("The theory ... is that there is inherent in a grant of authority to a department or agency to
perform a certain function, and to expend public funds in connection therewith, a responsibility which,
having been reposed specifically in such department or agency by the Congress, may not be transferred
except by specific action of the Congress. The soundness of this principle is without question."). Under
the Economy Act's 1920 predecessor, the Comptroller of the Treasury had also held that "a particular
duty placed on one branch of the Government by enactment of Congress or going to the essence of its
existence" could not be transferred to another agency without statutory authority. 27 CoMP. DEC. 892,
893 (1921); see also 8 COMP. GEN. 116 (1928).
210. GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-71; see also Decision of July 7, 1923 (no
file designation), 23A MS 101, quoted in 8 CoMP. GEN. 116, 118 (1928).
211. GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-71; see also Civ. Accounting and
Auditing Div., B-156010-O.M. (Comp. Gen. Mar. 16, 1965) (deciding that the transfer of debt collection
responsibilities under the Federal Claims Collection Act was not authorized by the Economy Act); B-
117604(7)-O.M. (Comp. Gen. June 30, 1970) (noting that while debt collection services can be provided
under the Economy Act); 17 CoMP. GEN. 1054 (1938) (holding, in a case predating the Federal Claims
Collection Act, that there was no authority for an agency to transfer its debt collection responsibilities).
212. GAO Red Book, supra note 197, at 12-71; see also Civ. Serv. Comm'n, B-
45488, at 5 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 11, 1944) (determining that while the Army would handle certain funds
on the Civil Service Commission's behalf, the fact that the "responsibility for the performance of the
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suggests that agency-to-agency delegation is permitted only if "(1) the agency
'retains responsibility' over the tasks; (2) the tasks are not part of the agency's
primary administrative functions; and (3) the tasks do not involve significant
decision-making authority. 21 3 In any case, the GAO declares, "[a]n agency can
acquire services under the Economy Act, but cannot turn over the ultimate
responsibility for administering its programs or activities. ' 214
This interpretation of the Economy Act appears to prohibit wholesale
transfers of power between agencies. Further, whether or not the transferred
authority may be considered part of the original agency's primary
administrative functions or involves significant decision-making authority may
not be consistent across the board, and could vary on a case-by-case basis.
Based on these inquiries, the Economy Act may also damn larger regimes, like
the wholesale transfer of drug import and export adjudications from Treasury to
the CBP to the FDA, or those that implicate individual rights, including rights
under Title VII. Thus, while the Economy Act provides some evidence that
Congress has long sought to empower agencies to interact in ways that benefit
the quality and functionality of governance, it does not constitute an
unimpeachable basis for interagency transfers of adjudication authority.
3. Quasi-Judicial Authority
Finally, it is worth noting briefly that while these transfers may appear
more defensible due to the fact that they impact adjudicative functions, they are
nonetheless ultimately shaped by legislative authority. In the early part of the
twentieth century, agencies began to adopt roles typically reserved for the
judiciary,215 arguably with the blessing of judges 16 and to the benefit of certain
function generally would remain" in the Commission qualified the transfer of functions from the
Commission to the Army as authorized under the Economy Act).
213. Marisam, supra note 174, at 887.
214. Id. at 12-72.
215. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article I11, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923 (1988); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 602 (2007); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power:
From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 779 (1986). The Supreme
Court's decision in Crowell v. Benson spurred this trend. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)
(suggesting that Congress could delegate adjudicative decision making to agencies provided that Article
III judges were given review of the proceedings); see also Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article
III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581,594 (1985); Merrill, supra note 183, at 980 ("Crowell is said to be
the 'first case that broadly approved transfers of trial jurisdiction from courts to agencies,' making it the
'fountainhead' for later decisions legitimating the role of the modem administrative agencies, thereby
'pav[ing] the way' for administrative agencies to act as adjudicators of a wide array of statutory
claims.").
216. "For example, the Court developed through common-law adjudication an
'appellate review' model of administrative agency oversight as a means to avoid being called upon to
decide 'matters that were not properly judicial but were rather 'administrative' in nature."' Aziz Z. Huq,
Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 68 (2015); see
also Merrill, supra note 183 at 944,990.
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adjudications.217 Over time, adjudication by the executive branch has
increased.218 Further, as agencies' judicial functions have expanded, so have the
administrative procedures through which agencies make legal decisions. This
growth in informal agency decision making has occurred in response to limited
agency resources; rapid increases in the number, form, and subject matter of
agency adjudications; 2 '9 and because of political and other complexities. 220
Further, rather than seeking to reclaim legal decision-making power from
agencies, the "judiciary has accommodated, if not encouraged, this procedural
evolution by according agencies broad discretion over the structure of their
decision-making procedures and declining to impose significant constitutional
or statutory constraints on that choice. ' 22 ' The result is that courts have
allowed, over time, greater agency autonomy to engage in adjudication, and
fewer procedural constraints on the adjudicatory process itself.
However, while the executive branch's power to perform "judicial"
functions is fairly expansive,2 22 neither an agency's authority to coordinate
within a decision-making process nor its potential ability to transfer its full
jurisdiction to adjudicate to another agency flows from its quasi-judicial power.
As an initial matter, since an agency's option to adjudicate in any given
substantive area is determined in the first instance by statute, it is only with
adequate legislative delegation that agencies may exercise the substantial quasi-
judicial powers that Article III courts have afforded them. More specifically, as
noted earlier, the transfer of adjudicative authority involves an agency engaging
in the self-determination of administrative jurisdiction. Thus, even if Article III
courts choose to be permissive of this activity,223 it is nonetheless at best
circumscribed by the limits of legislative delegation of judicial authority to
agencies, and at worst unconstitutional.224
217. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 16.
218. See id. ("[A]dministrative agencies have assumed an increasingly important role
in the legal regulation of economic and social activity, supplanting many of the functions previously
performed by other governmental institutions, particularly the courts.").
219. Id. at 499; see also id. at 475 (discussing the types of intra-agency "activities that
overlap with the domain of judicial trials" and noting that if "not for administrative agencies, a
significant component of all three types of these activities would be handled through judicial trials").
220. Even intra-agency adjudication processes are complicated by agencies' "size and
scope, their strong institutional cultures, their attachment to past practice, the complexity of the issues
they decide, the distribution of information within them, the interests of their permanent employees in
avoiding political influence, and the existence of long-term relationships between employees and outside
parties." Barron & Kagan, supra note 134, at 249. These matters are intensified as the personnel,
politics, and interests of multiple agencies are added to the mix.
221. Levy & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 473. For instance, courts have accommodated
this shift by developing "a flexible approach to what process is due that permits relatively informal
procedures in many cases" and by confirming that "ambiguous statutes will seldom trigger the APA's
formal adjudication provisions." Id. at 499.
222. See id.; Merrill, supra note 171 at 247. But see Northern Pipeline Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
223. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
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B. Legitimacy in Interagency Coordination Authority
Until now, this Section has focused on the uncertain foundations for
interagency transfers of adjudication authority that agencies have relied on thus
far in the formation of these arrangements. This subsection suggests, however,
that at least one set of agencies relied on sound authority to further this type of
transfer: DHS and DOL, in the first example explored in this Article. 25 As
discussed earlier, these agencies based their transfer of authority to adjudicate
H-2B season nonagricultural worker visas from DHS to DOL on legislative
authority granted to DHS to interact with another agency of its choosing in
order to adjudicate these petitions.226 While this regulatory agreement draws
from a preexisting case-by-case consultation between DHS and DOL, this
subsection proposes that interagency transfers of adjudication authority more
broadly be considered a legitimate interpretation of authority to coordinate or
consult under certain circumstances that will be outlined in the rest of this Part
and in the next.
1. Flexibility in Authority to Coordinate
Agencies' opportunities to interact of their own volition have grown as
Congress has continued to delegate to specific agencies the flexible authority to
coordinate with others. Agencies participate in coordinated rulemaking on the
basis of imprecise statutory authority, a practice that relieves Congress from
having to put forth effort227 or overcome political obstacles in order to provide
more specific instruction to agencies. Congress may also anticipate or intend
flexibility in collaborative adjudication processes, to the extent they resemble
coordinated rulemaking by encouraging agencies to jointly contribute resources
to reach a common outcome.228 And indeed, agency roles in those coordinated
interagency adjudication processes that most closely resemble joint rulemaking
225. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
227. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 567 (2009)
("When Congress enlists the aid of agencies to set regulatory policy, it might do so because it lacks the
requisite time and expertise to formulate the details of such policy."); Gersen, supra note 12, at 211
("Congress could produce policy internally, but given limitations of time, resources, and the potentially
lower costs of bureaucratic production, delegation to agencies will often prove a more desirable
alternative."); Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 721, 722-23 (1985) (explaining that popular explanations for legislative delegation include
complexity of issues and avoidance of costs embedded in regulation itself).
228. See id. at 846; This work dovetails with the set of political theory that views
redundancy as both useful to constraining agency shirking and beneficial to outcomes on its own terms.
See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS 209-45 (1985); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981);
Katyal, supra note 173, at 2314-27; Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of
Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969); O'Connell, supra note 12; Matthew C.
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1463 (2011);
Ting, supra note 12; James Q. Wilson, BUREAUCRACY 274 (1989).
Vol. 34, 2017
Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority
are almost always flexible.229 Congress may even compel agencies to interact
on the basis of vague authority. 230 For instance, DHS was not only authorized
to consult with other agencies in regards to its adjudication of H-2B visas, but
also charged with doing so, with any agency of DHS's choosing.23 1 DHS
selected DOL because of the obvious expertise the DOL has concerning
seasonal worker visas.2 32
Under the somewhat rare circumstances 233 in which courts have
questioned whether interagency agreements to coordinate in adjudication are
permissible constructions of statute, they have rejected the idea that these
policies are implicitly banned by Congress. For instance, while evaluating the
constitutionality of interagency coordination in furtherance of the adjudication
of claims for Clean Water Act permits, the D.C. Circuit debated the general
question of whether "inter-agency consultation and coordination" is an
impermissible construction of statutory intent in any circumstance.234 Here, the
appellate court reversed the district court's judgment with impassioned
language in favor of interagency coordination. While this and other D.C Circuit
cases also suggest that whether interagency coordination in adjudication is a
reasonable interpretation of statute in any instance is not yet settled doctrine, 235
this avenue for agency coordination has certainly not been foreclosed.
229. See Shah, supra note 2, at 890-91 (Appendix A); see, e.g., supra note 180.
230. As Jennifer Selin has suggested in correspondence:
In my work on the Sourcebook and in developing my measure of agency
independence[, I found] 45 of the 321 agencies in my data are required to get
outside approval from another agency or political actor before taking specific
actions. This suggests that Congress can and does differentiate between the flexible
language of "coordinate" and "consult" and the mandatory language of "with the
approval of' or "shall jointly," and ultimately serves to support your argument that
Congress may have expectations that agencies interact on the basis of coordinating
authority in order to improve the administrative process.
Email from Jennifer L. Selin, Professor, Univ. of Illinois, to the Author (June 13, 2016, 11:19 EDT) (on
file with author); see also DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, WASHINGTON, DC: ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(2012).
231. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also G.H. Daniels III &
Associates, Inc., 626 Fed. Appx. 205, 209-10 ("Section 11 84(c)(1) of the INA says DHS shall determine
whether to allow for the admission of H-2B workers 'after consultation with appropriate agencies of the
Government."').
232. See id. at 210 ("DHS must determine the "if' and "when" of the statute,
something within the expertise of DOL. .. . DHS, quite sensibly, relies on that expertise."); see also
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2364 (2001) ("The Supreme Court has applied the doctrine only when Congress has delegated power
directly to the President-never when Congress has delegated power to agency officials.")
234. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 246-49 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
235. See id.; see, e.g., Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios
v. Dep't of the Treasury, 638 F.3d 794,803 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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However, the D.C. Circuit has taken the view that "overlapping" or shared
6 be237statutory authority" may not be adequately interpreted by any one agency.
For instance, in the rulemaking context, courts have been skeptical of deferring
to any one agency's exercise of shared authority, 38 and instead have sought to
establish that Congress, in fact, delegated the authority primarily to one agency
(and, perhaps, did not intend the apparent overlap).2 39 Also, when the Supreme
Court has addressed conflicting agency interpretations of the same statute in
joint rulemaking, its analysis has focused on determining which agency
Congress intended to empower.2 4 0 Further, in a case concerning a collaborative
form of coordinated interagency adjudication under the McKinney-Vento
Homeless Assistance Act, in which HHS was empowered to evaluate
applications under the Act at the same time as the General Services
Administration, the court determined, bluntly, that if "'multiple agencies are
charged with administering a statute, a single agency's interpretation is
generally not entitled to Chevron deference.' ' '241
Because of a lack of overlapping authority in interagency transfers of
adjudication authority, the more pertinent question is whether Congress
intended to allow agencies to transfer their singular authority to other agencies
under any circumstances, and if so, how best to establish this intent. 42 Thus far,
two courts of appeals, albeit in just one decision each, have suggested that
236. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
237. Sharkey, supra note 13, at 355.
238. Arguably, "the Chevron framework implicitly presumes that only one agency-if
any at all-should be accorded deference in statutory interpretation." William Weaver, Multiple-Agency
Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, 67 VAND. L. REV. 275, 292 (2014). According to the Court,
granting deference in situations where multiple agencies "share[] responsibility for the administration of
the statute ... would lay the groundwork for a regulatory regime in which either the same statute is
interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach the courthouse
first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all."' Rapaport v. Dep't of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212,216-
17 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Catherine Sharkey argues, further, that this stance has been referred to as the
"traditional view," and has been "taken to heart by the lower federal courts." Sharkey, supra note 13, at
342-43.
239. Catherine Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron's Retreat, at 20 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) ("King might have provided the Chief Justice an opportunity to solidify
[a holding that] the Act jointly authorized IRS and HHS to administer various sections of the statutes,
sometimes in tandem. Thus, no one of them should be granted Chevron deference. But the Chief Justice
did not seize this chance and instead simply concluded that the IRS ... deserved no deference.").
240. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144
(1991) (addressing two conflicting agency interpretations of a provision in OSHA, despite the fact that
both were explicitly delegated authority under statute); Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)
(suggesting that a Chevron analysis requires determination of the administrative actor in which Congress
sought to vest interpretive power).
241. New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F. Supp. 2d 103, 122 (D.D.C.
2010); see also Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Sharkey, supra note 13, at 354.
242. Alternatively, these transfers might be constrained on the basis of a
"nondelegation canon" limiting agency power. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) ("Reports of the death of the nondelegation doctrine have been
greatly exaggerated. Rather than having been abandoned, the doctrine has merely been renamed and
relocated. Its current home consists of a set of nondelegation canons, which forbid executive agencies
from making certain decisions on their own.").
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legislatively delegated authority to coordinate does not give agencies the power
to transfer their statutorily defined decision-making jurisdiction. Decades ago,
while examining the relationship between the EEOC and OFCCP, the Eighth
Circuit maintained that the EEOC has statutory authority to "coordinate" with
the OFCCP and other agencies,243 but determined, nonetheless that the
"primary responsibility for enforcing the requirements of Title VII rests with
the EEOC. 244 In addition, as noted earlier, the Tenth Circuit found DHS's
transfer of the authority to adjudicate H-2B worker visas to be an impermissible
subdelegation and not a reasonable interpretation of statutory authority to
consult with another agency.245
2. Interagency Transfers as Coordination
Despite the aforementioned decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits,
agencies' transfers of adjudicative power should be justified as part and parcel
of legislatively delegated authority to coordinate, consult, or otherwise interact.
Broadly speaking, interagency transfers of adjudication authority should be
understood as based legitimately in authority to coordinate to the extent they
further the ideals of good governance that drive Congress to authorize agencies
to interact with one another, especially if there is normative value to preserving
and encouraging their growth.
Arguably, interagency transfers of adjudication authority could lead to
better administrative decision making if stakeholders focus on policing agency
action rather than on the substance of the statutory delegation itself.246 A
presumption that authority to coordinate permits interagency transfers of
adjudication authority would encourage this approach. And while this
presumption does not cast aside nondelegation principles altogether in favor of
agency self-governing mechanisms,247 it does rely on an understanding of
243. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 1979); see also
supra note 76.
244. Id. at 905.
245. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
246. See Bressman, supra note 100, at 1402 (championing "the emergence of a new
delegation doctrine" that focuses on "how (or how well) the law is been made" rather than on "who
ought to make the law" because this approach "reinforces a certain conception of democracy [and]
ensures that agencies exercise their delegated authority in a manner that promotes the rule of law,
accountability, public responsiveness, and individual liberty. Furthermore, it advances these values
without having either to prohibit delegation or to approve delegation wholesale"); Linda D. Jellum,
"Which Is To Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate
Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 857 (2009) (suggesting that if the U.S. Constitution had
included an explicit separation of powers clause, "the rise of the modem administrative agency would
have been impossible," because of the fact that agencies take on apparently legislative and judicial
functions); Metzger, supra note 107, at 1484 (championing the idea that standards that prevent abuse,
encourage transparency, and improve accountability arguably represent an effort to adapt nondelegation
doctrine to the realities of the modem administrative state in the public-private delegation context).
247. One example would be the Due Process Clause, which many argue is more active
and useful than the nondelegation doctrine. See Sotirios A. Barber, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1975); Bressman, supra note 100, at 1442; Rebecca L.
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traditional principles of structural constitutionalism that incorporates an
appreciation of how agency-led changes to administrative frameworks,
including burden shifting, can positively impact administrative process.
At their core, interagency transfers of adjudication authority are similar to
more typical forms of coordination anticipated by this type of authority. As Part
I illustrates, such arrangements often draw on preexisting, synergistic
interactions between agencies seeking to consolidate their work, improve their
relationships, or perhaps even to work together in order to optimize the impact
of limited funding, access to resources or national outlets, or expertise.
Thus, although these agreements involve giving away decision-making
jurisdiction, they may nonetheless uphold Congress's intention that agencies
interact in order to carry out their mandates better if agencies are able to use
these arrangements to maximize the functionality of adjudicative processes
while also maintaining accountability and keeping rule of law concerns at bay.
Put another way, when these agency burden-shifting agreements improve the
implementation of administrative adjudication, they fulfill Congress's core
expectation that agencies interact on the basis of coordinating authority in order
to improve the relevant administrative process24 8 even if the interaction diverges
from the paradigm of agencies coordinating by collaborating or competing for
power.
Finally, at least a few current regimes could be anchored in the authority
to coordinate. As explained earlier, DHS and DOL based their regulation
concretizing interagency transfers of adjudication authority on legislation
enabling interagency coordination. Other forms of coordination authority
legitimize agencies making these transfers on the basis of more informal
agreements, and with a variety of agencies. For instance, per the Civil Rights
Act, "[t]he [EEOC] shall have power to cooperate with and, with their consent,
utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies, both public and private, and
individuals. ' 249 Further, at least one court has suggested that an agreement
under this language could be created simply by a Memorandum of
Understanding- in other words, that the EEOC may shape its coordination
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1553 (1991) (linking the
nondelegation doctrine to due process); Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due
Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2011) (arguing in general that
"congressional delegation of lawmaking powers can be reconciled with the Constitution's republican
design but only if courts set aside the conventional wisdom that Articles I and II alone constrain
congressional delegation" under the nondelegation doctrine); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 479 (1989); David M.
Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L. 647, 649, 694 (1986) (arguing that
"due process is most satisfactory" of the available mechanisms for oversight of public/private delegation
"because due process traditionally includes a concern about the underlying problem with private
delegation: the self-interested decisionmaker"); Volokh, supra note 121, at 940, 955 (suggesting that the
"non-delegation doctrine seems to have much less bite than the Due Process Clause in potentially
controlling private delegations of regulatory power").
248. See supra note 230.
249. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253-266 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(g)(1) (2012)).
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with other agencies informally. 250 These conceptions of coordinating authority,
although piecemeal, nonetheless lend credence to the current practices
associated with agencies' creation of transfer arrangements.
IV. Fostering Beneficial Arrangements
This Article argues in favor of allowing agencies to create innovative
burden-shifting agreements. However, it also acknowledges that even
potentially beneficial endogenous changes to agency decision-making
structures may run counter to overarching norms of administrative law and
even modernized principles of structural constitutionalism if not properly
checked. Unlike joint rulemaking 251 and other types of coordinated interagency
adjudication,25 2 however, interagency transfers of adjudication authority have
few interagency, and no consistent interbranch or public, checking
mechanisms.
This Part presents a proposal for structured judicial review of these
transfers, on a case-by-case basis, to encourage the development of interagency
transfers of adjudicative authority that genuinely uphold the ideals of good
governance that motivate congressional delegation to agencies of the power to
interact with one another (coordinate, consult, etc.). The emphasis on
congressional intent in this context serves as a useful, if imperfect, proxy for
the substance of law, the public's expectations of how law should be enforced,
and the contours of legislative authority, all of which are crucial to any
consideration of whether an agency is in danger of appropriating legislative
power.
First, this Part considers the suitability of each branch to evaluate these
arrangements, and settles on the judicial branch as the most practical option for
ensuring that agencies are both engaging in high quality decision making and
properly checked for constitutional purposes, due to its traditional role as
overseer of administrative adjudication and arbiter of separation of powers
concerns. Then, this Part draws from recent insights suggesting more proactive
court review of agency activity in order to outline a framework for consistent
judicial oversight. These recommendations are grounded in the understanding
that some of the major benefits of interagency transfers of adjudication
authority, such as the potential emergence of a responsible agency and the
intensification of agency expertise, align with principles of judicial review that
courts already use to evaluate agency activity. These include both a theory of
judicial deference and hard look review, the latter of which is particularly
250. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 1979).
251. See Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. 183, 210
(2013) (noting that in joint rulemaking, "interagency comments, elevation procedures, and vetoes are all
tools that agencies have deployed effectively to minimize negative consequences from other agencies'
actions").
252. See Shah, supra note 2, at 814-20.
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suited to courts' examination of administrative decision-making processes. This
is not to say that oversight from the other branches of government is not
potentially complementary. In particular, executive oversight that improves the
quality of coordination,2 5 3 thus making it more likely to pass judicial muster,
may be worth implementing as well.254
A. Interbranch Checking Mechanisms
Congress, the executive branch itself, or courts could help determine
whether interagency transfers of adjudication authority are beneficial and
legitimate. After exploring each of these options, this subsection settles on the
judicial branch as the most suitable overseer of these novel interagency
agreements for various reasons, including the judiciary's relative flexibility and
lack of bias. Overall, the framework proffered in this Part suggests that courts
evaluate the quality of these wholesale transfers in order (in larger part, if not
only) to determine whether they are sufficiently rooted in statutory authority to
coordinate, and that Congress and the executive branch may offer some partial
oversight and management that support courts' efforts.
1. Congress
Congress could control interagency transfers of adjudication authority ex
ante.25 For instance, theoretically, these transfers could be constrained up front
by more specific legislative language. The difficulty with this solution is that
Congress may not become aware that an agency transfer of adjudicative power
has occurred,256 given the difficulty of locating these agreements. 7 Legislators
may also choose to oversee agency agreements ex post (for instance, by
holding hearings, asking the GAO to investigate, and using appropriations
riders to curtail certain agency actions 258). Still, even if legislators are made
aware of this activity, 259 they may not be able-or wish-to engage in agency-
level management.26 ° For instance, Congress may prefer to leave the specified
application of legislation up to the discretion of agencies 26 and may even
253. Shah, supra note 2, at 850-81 (arguing for oversight of only the quality, not the
substance, of interagency coordination in adjudication).
254. See Kagan, supra note 233, at 2372-85 (suggesting that courts use deference
doctrine and hard look review to privilege those agency activities benefiting from upper-level executive
oversight).
255. See supra note 11 3 and accompanying text.
256. There is little legislative history to indicate that Congress knows much about it.
257. See discussion, supra, p. 11.
258. I would like to thank Anne Joseph O'Connell for this insight.
259. See supra note 113.
260. See supra note 196, 230 and accompanying text.
261. "Congress is not free from particularistic legislation ... neither does it devote its
energies solely to narrow, individually tailored policy at the expense of larger issues." Epstein &
O'Halloran, supra note 114. Mark Tushnet has suggested, more broadly, that a "large-scale
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intend to allow agencies to act on their own knowledge, notwithstanding that
how much power and freedom Congress may indeed delegate to agencies is up
for debate.262 Beyond this, the legislature's ability to effectively check these
agreements is limited, even if it were so inclined. For one, as the previous Part
suggests, agencies currently draw their authority to make these arrangements
from a variety of fragmented legislative sources, and there is no consistency in
Congress's approach to drafting legislation such that it may serve as a tool to
help agencies determine which exercises of discretion are permissible, let alone
constrain those that are not. This problem could feasibly be avoided if agencies
were to adopt the practice of basing these agreements in authority to
administrative state is possible even without delegation, as long as the legislature is able to enact laws
containing sufficiently detailed guidelines for bureaucracies." Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 109
(1999). In addition, as Metzger notes, "Congress will often delegate quite broad authority to
administrative agencies to set policy, whether because those are the only terms on which legislative
agreement could be reached, uncertainty and lack of information preclude more limited delegations and
create a need for agency expertise, or members of Congress seek to gain political credit and minimize
political blame." Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1293, 1323 (2012).
262. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071. 2076-78 (1990) (arguing that "Chevron applies only in cases of congressional delegation of law-
making authority" and that "an important separation of powers function [is served] by requiring
legislative rather than merely administrative deliberation..."). Arguably, if the statute does not have an
"intelligible principle" or clarity of intent, it may constitute an impermissible delegation of open-ended
power. See David Horton, Arbitration As Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 470 (2011) (noting that
"when Congress passes an open-ended statute that gives agencies the freedom to fill the gaps ... the
Court will strike down [this] public delegation if Congress has failed to articulate an 'intelligible
principle' to limit the agency's discretion"). On the one hand, scholars have suggested that the import of
the nondelegation doctrine has waned. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) ("A statutory grant of authority to the
executive branch or other agents never effects a delegation of legislative power."); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001) ("It is, after all, a commonplace that
the nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at all."); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (stating that the nondelegation doctrine "has had one good year, and 211 bad
ones (and counting)"); Fallon, supra note 215, at 984 ("[T]he so-called 'nondelegation doctrine'
[purports] to forbid substantially standardless delegations of lawmaking power to administrative
agencies[;] [however][,1 leading commentators regard the nondelegation doctrine as defunct."); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003) ("A
statutory grant of authority to the executive branch or other agents can never amount to a delegation of
legislative power. Agents acting within the terms of such a statutory grant are exercising executive
power, not legislative power. The standard nondelegation doctrine, which holds that statutory grants of
authority 'amount to' or 'effect' a delegation of legislative power if they are too broad or confer
excessive discretion, is no more than a vague and ultimately uncashable metaphor."). Still, it has
enjoyed some recent attention from scholars like Larry Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash, and Cynthia
Farina, who focus on agency power (notwithstanding that the nexus of the nondelegation doctrine and
agency coordination remains underexplored by the literature). See generally, e.g., Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003) (suggesting that many agency delegations are problematic because they may
run afoul of the spirit of the nondelegation doctrine); see also Fallon, supra note 215, at 984 ("Although
leading commentators regard the nondelegation doctrine as defunct, standardless delegations can lead to
varieties of arbitrariness in the development and enforcement of law that the judicial branch should,
under the separation of powers, be able to check."); Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation,
33 HARRV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (2010). Note, however, that the Supreme Court's views on the impact
of the nondelegation doctrine on agency activity are sparse.
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coordinate, but only if Congress could structure this authority to establish
nuanced control of agencies' transfer agreements.
As general matter, a statutory provision explicitly banning agencies from
giving away their decision-making power to other agencies-whether included
in language authorizing coordination or in an amendment to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) or the Economy Act-may be too blunt an instrument,
functionally, in that it would preclude agencies from engaging in even the most
high-quality and beneficial of transfers. Further, a heavy-handed approach
might also encourage legislative appropriation of executive power.263 Another
possibility is a statute requiring agencies to submit proposals for such transfers
to Congress and forcing agencies to wait for approval to implement these
transfers. However, perhaps even more so than requiring agencies to concretize
their agreement via the regulatory process (as opposed to simple interagency
agreement),264 improvements in accountability and the benefits of specified
legal authority may be offset by reductions in agencies' ability to respond
nimbly to the needs they seek to solve via the transfer. Alternatively, allowing
the transfers to go into effect unless Congress passes a joint resolution of
disapproval or takes similar action265 may mean that legislative oversight is
stymied in practice by congressional inaction 26 6 or other hiccups in the
implementation of the reviewing legislation.
263. An analogous example is a super-statute like the REINS Act, which would
effectively strip executive agencies of their rulemaking authority, requiring that they submit rule
proposals to Congress for approval or rejection. Supporters of the REINS Act argue that it would restore
legislative power to Congress and therefore implement the separation of powers as constitutionally
intended. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 135 (2013) (arguing that the REINS Act "would implement the
constitutional ideal that the legislature makes the laws" and "would merely reclaim, for Congress,
powers that Congress was not required to delegate"). Those opposed to the REINS Act have suggested
that it may be for violating the separation of powers. See Sally Katzen, Why the REINS Act is Unwise If
Not Also Unconstitutional, REGBLOG (May 3, 2011), http://www.regblog.org/2011/05/03/why-the-reins-
act-is-unwise-if-not-also-unconstitutional (suggesting that the Act may run afoul of the Court's previous
separation of powers jurisprudence on two grounds-first, because it "involve[s] an attempt by Congress
to increase its own powers at the expense of the executive branch", and second, because it
"impermissibly interfere[s] with the President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions,"
including the obligation to faithfully execute the laws-and noting that developing and issuing
regulations implementing legislation passed by Congress is part of the executive branch's duty to
faithfully execute the laws).
264. See supra Section ll.A.2.
265. I would like to thank Jennifer Nou for this suggestion. Cf. Congressional Review
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 (1996) (prescribing special expedited procedures, which limit debate in the House
and ban a Senate filibuster, for consideration of the resolution, for Congressional consideration of an
agency rule); Richard S. Beth, U.S. Congressional Research Service, Disapproval of Regulations by
Congress: Procedure Under the Congressional Review Act (RL31160; Oct. 10, 2001).
266. Cf. Stuart Shapiro, The Congressional Review Act, Rarely Used and (Almost
Always) Unsuccessful, THE HILL, Apr. 17, 2015 (discussing the Congressional Review Act (CRA), an
oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule issued by a federal agency that has only been
implemented once); see also MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43992, THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4 (2015) (discussing additional
obstacles to the successful implementation of the CRA).
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However, language that is specific to an area of administrative law or an
agency, and that explicitly holds agencies to standards for coordination, could
benefit transfers of adjudication processes (and in particular, transfers of
administrative adjudication that is not reviewable by courts). 2 67 Given its
limited bandwidth, Congress could target those statutes that authorize the
administrative adjudication of public rights, which courts review less often than
they do the administrative adjudication of private rights-although prioritizing
the adjudication of private rights2 68 might better protect individual claimants
and thus better uphold this core value of adjudication.
Finally, legislative attention to outcomes may not improve the legitimacy
of the process anyway.269 For instance, these transfers may lead to positive
outcomes that efficiency-minded overseers like the GAO are inclined to
preserve despite other costs. Further, given Congress's limitations, it is far from
certain that congressional oversight would encourage even functionally
beneficial outcomes. 70 Moreover, substituting congressional judgment for
agencies' on-the-ground knowledge of shifts in agencies' capacity for decision
making may leave processes stagnant and agency actors waiting for
congressionally led updates that never come, and that in turn stifle agency
innovation.
2. Executive
By some accounts, executive leadership is in the best position to
implement certain agency-checking mechanisms.27' Indeed, I advocate for
executive oversight in my previous work,272 which deals primarily with
coordinated interagency adjudication involving collaboration and other forms
of shared authority that do not necessarily implicate constitutional concerns.
Even in regards to interagency transfers of adjudication authority, which
267. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 559, 574 (2007); see also Fallon, supra note 215, at 962; Merrill, supra note 183, at 984;see
generally Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article IlI Canon, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 1569 (2013) (arguing that Article III courts should apply more robust review to agency
adjudication where private rights are at stake).
269. See Gersen, supra note 21, at 713 (suggesting that a focus on outcomes does not
necessarily reduce burden shifting).
270. Freeman & Spence, supra note 106, at 2-3 (noting that "congressional
dysfunction ... [has] reduced [the] probability that Congress will update regulatory legislation in
response to significant new economic, scientific, or technological developments," and that this has
important implications for the most well-known, by Congress, of administrative functions-
rulemaking).
271. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 233, at 2339; Nou, supra note 17, at 65 ("The
executive branch ... has a singular figurehead who can be held accountable and represents the national
interest; it possesses a wide range of expertise; it is relatively expedient and wields a number of formal
and informal sticks that can help to encourage compliance.").
272. Shah, supra note 2, at 850-81 (arguing for oversight of only the quality, not the
substance, of interagency coordination in adjudication).
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concern wholesale transfers of authority that have a greater potential for
constitutional illegitimacy, the executive branch could serve to organize or
even check interagency transfers of adjudication authority-for instance, via
upper-level oversight of interagency coordination,273 or by deploying the Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) to engage in some manner of mediation, 274 as it does
when agencies fight over rulemaking power. On the one hand, there has been
criticism of the feasibility of White House oversight of coordinated interagency
adjudication as a whole.275 On the other hand, executive oversight, for instance,
by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) or a similar
office276 or the Administrative Conference of the United States,277 could raise
the quality of some types of administrative decision making. In addition, such
oversight could perhaps inadvertently protect against potential agency
violations of constitutional precepts by minimizing interagency conflicts,
improving transparency and raising the profile of claimants' rights in
coordinated interagency adjudication.
One problem with this solution is that agencies may be less motivated to
seek such arbitration (for instance, by OLC or OIRA) because they have
already decided how best to apportion authority. Further, it is unclear how
effective, or how motivated,278 the executive branch would be in limiting its
own power vis- -vis the other branches, for instance, by curtailing its own
agencies' efforts to define their jurisdiction. This is not to say that executive
oversight is unable to play a role in furthering a disciplined application of
separation of powers. 279 However, the President's role in this capacity is more
commonly motivated by the desire to protect executive branch powers from
allegations that they are abusive so as to preserve them, not to limit them to
maintain the integrity of the other two branches .280
273. Id.at850-81.
274. I would like to thank Josh Chafetz and Anne Joseph O'Connell for this insight.
275. POSNER, supra note 2, at 45-46 (critiquing Shah's proposal that there be
executive oversight of coordinated interagency adjudication).
276. See Nou, supra note 17, at 65 (suggesting that "calls for the establishment of
executive branch institutions either modeled on or expanding the role of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to address one coordination ailment or another are increasingly common-
and justly so); see also Kagan, supra note 233, at 2331-46; Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1874-75 (2013).
277. See Nou, supra note 17, at 72-74.
278. See Verkuil, supra note 172, at 326; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 173, at 721.
279. See Strauss, supra note 173, at 597 ("Whatever arrangements are made, one must
remain able to characterize the President as the unitary, politically accountable head of all law-
administration, sufficiently potent in his own relationships with those who actually perform it to serve as
an effective counter to a feared Congress. The central inquiry is to identify those relationships that are
necessary, either to conform with the constitutional text [of separation of powers] or to preserve the
possibility of the President's continuing effectiveness.").
280. See Richard A. Nagareda, Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional Roles: Lessons
from the OMB Experience, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 591,606 (1988).
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Another potential concern is that executive oversight might contribute to
policy drift,28 ' for instance, by allowing the President to favor those agreements
that support her own political values (or otherwise lead to lock-in effects282) or
the executive branch's interests.283 Finally, apportioning extensive power to the
President to determine herself how to parcel out power to agencies could mark
a return to previous era, but without legislative constraints of that era. Prior to
INS v. Chadha, the President often determined the assignment of power to
agencies. 211 "The President's authority to reorganize bureaucratic structures had
an important string attached, however: the legislative veto. ' 285 This practice
abated after the courts determined that this reassignment power allowed the
executive to infringe on the legislative power to determine agencies'
enforcement jurisdiction; in the process, the legislative veto was also
eradicated.286 A return to this dynamic could be problematic in instances in
which Congress intended to delegate power to a certain agency and might, as
was an implicit concern around the time of Chadha ,287 afford the president
legislative authority (or otherwise aggrandize executive power 88) in violation
of separation of powers.
3. Judiciary
While "[e]xecutive oversight promotes coordination between different
parts of the executive branch, [it is] judicial review [that] embodies a vision of
separation of powers. '289 Indeed, judicial review has long been understood as
an important, relatively impartially rendered mechanism for checking executive
281. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article 1, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2142 (2004) (defining policy drift as "the danger that
agencies will promote policies that diverge from those intended by the enacting legislature").
282. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. LJ. 97, 114-115 (2000).
283. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38-41 (1971).
284. Renan, supra note 12, at 236 ("Since its inception in the 1930s and until Chadha,
presidential reorganizations were a core tool of presidential administration. Presidents routinely
deployed the reorganization power delegated by Congress, submitting over 100 plans between 1932 and
1984." (citations omitted)).
285. Id. at 236-37.
286. See id. at 237; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
287. See id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
288. There is data showing that, in order to check the Executive, "Congress does not
delegate wholesale to the Executive[,] Congress takes a major role in specifying the details of policy[,
and that when] Congress does delegate, it also constrains executive discretion with restrictive
administrative procedures." Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 114, at 985.
289. Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm "With Teeth": Heightened Judicial Review in
the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1591 n.1 (2014) (citing Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J.
1337, 1367-69 (2013); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987
DUKE L.J. 387,440)).
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power. 290 Further, Article III courts are empowered2 9 1 and encouraged292 to hold
unlawful those agency actions that violate constitutional precepts, and are
flexible enough to grow to do SO, 2 93 perhaps even more than the legislative
branch.2 94 Since agency decisions outside normal procedures may escape public
oversight and the ambit of the APA, judicial review of administrative policies'
constitutionality is "essential to a properly functioning democracy. 29 5 There
are certainly challenges to sorting out the mechanism for review of interagency
transfers of decision-making power, in part because they lie at the intersection
of coordination 296 and administrative adjudication.297 However, the lack of
settled doctrine on interagency coordination 298 and recent Supreme Court299 and
290. See Merrill, supra note 183, at 943; Nagareda, supra note 280, at 627 (1988)
("Pursuant to separation of powers principles, courts can safeguard the prerogatives of other institutions
to engage in experimentation within the bounds of law."); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1158 (2000) ("The Constitution[] grant[s] specific
powers to permit the checking of one department by another [including] federal courts' power of judicial
review"); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 452 (1991) (suggesting that "[i]t is our
position that the centrality of the separation of powers concept to American political theory should be
recognized, and that as a result the Court's enforcement of that concept needs to become considerably
more vigorous than it has been in the recent past"); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and
Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 57 (1965) ("Judicial protection from official oppression,
whatever its form, remains a primary need. 'To stand between the individual and arbitrary action by the
Government,' said Mr. Justice Jackson, 'is the highest function of this Court."'). But see Huq, supra
note 18, at 1686 ("Courts are not well positioned to make judgments about the limits of intermural
bargains and have historically exercised poor judgment in discerning the likely effects of intermural
deals.").
291. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(l)(B) (2012).
292. "[T]he notion of checks and balances retains descriptive power and ... utility
within the constraint of accepting the reality of the existing government." Strauss, supra note 173, at
582. For instance, separation of powers theory focusing on conflicts of interest suggests that "rules
against bias or interest and the right to a fair hearing [to] help control the exercise of executive power."
Verkuil, supra note 172, at 307 (suggesting in general that "the presence of a conflict of interest argues
in favor of branch separation or, at the individual public official level, of separation of functions within
the particular branch").
293. "Part of the reason for [the appellate review model's] success is its adaptability."
Merrill, supra note 183, at 945.
294. See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 128, at 1727 (noting also that judicial
"deference regimes are more like canons of statutory construction, applied episodically but reflecting
deeper judicial commitments, than like binding precedents, faithfully applied, distinguished, or
overruled").
295. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2072 (2011).
296. "Judicially developed principles and doctrines of [deference to] administrative
law [are particularly] puzzling" within the context of administrative adjudication; certainly, "an inquiry
into actual congressional intent" while evaluating any complicated interagency process will not be
simple. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1032; see also id. at 1061-72 (discussing the complex
interaction between intra-agency relationships and fundamental deference doctrine).
297. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 134, at 203 (examining the complexities of the
judicial evaluation of administrative adjudication).
298. See supra notes 233-245 and accompanying text.
299. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (suggesting that the IRS would
never have been empowered to implement Obamacare: "The tax credits are among the Act's key
reforms ... . [W]hether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep
,economic and political significance' that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to
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scholarly insights encouraging more proactive judicial oversight of agencies 300
have rendered judicial review "ripe for reassessment. ' 0 '
The rest of this Part suggests ways in which courts may draw from
longstanding frameworks of judicial review to evaluate whether interagency
transfers of adjudication authority adequately uphold the tenets of good
governance that underlie grants of authority to agencies allowing them to
coordinate, consult, or otherwise interact with another agency. There are no
clear, universal legislative benchmarks for the development of this framework,
as standards of good governance are imprecise and unspecified in statutes
espousing coordination, like the Economy Act. 30 2 Further, without substantive
context, such as legislative history pertinent to the grant of authority to
coordinate, it may be difficult for courts to rank the merits of competing aims
(for instance, efficiency versus attention to legal nuance, expertise-based versus
political approaches, bureaucratic versus ideological aims, etc.).
The solution this subsection proposes is that courts apply norms of good
governance that doctrines of judicial review have already identified as
indicative of whether agencies have acted according to legislative expectations.
By offering courts a standard based in current doctrine, this approach allows
judicial oversight of interagency transfers of adjudication authority to draw
from an already existing model, instead of forcing courts to reinvent the wheel.
Over time, hopefully, agencies and courts will engage in a system of feedback
and self-correction in which agencies seek to be responsive to past judicial
decisions by formulating transfers that are more likely to pass courts' muster.
Further, courts' decisions could attract the attention of Congress, which may
then seek to create some broad limits on agencies that (for instance) appear to
be abusing the opportunity to coordinate by repeatedly establishing low-quality
transfers.
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. It is especially unlikely that
Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health
insurance policy of this sort." (citations omitted)); see generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699
(2015) (holding that the EPA interpreted the Clear Air Act unreasonably by refusing to consider the cost
of regulating power plants); see also Merrill, supra note 183, at 983 (suggesting that the Supreme Court
is trending towards less deference to agencies).
300. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984, 1058 (1990) ("[Olur data ... indicate a
growing tendency of reviewing courts to defer to agencies [and] also suggest that the Supreme Court's
Chevron decision has reinforced that deference."); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 984 (1992) (reconciling their data with Schuck's and Elliott's work to
suggest that lower courts are particularly deferential).
301. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1137 ("Courts do have important roles to play
in ensuring that coordination stays within lawful bounds and policing its potential impact on the
separation of powers."); Nou, supra note 17, at 66.
302. See, e.g., supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
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B. A Framework for Judicial Oversight
This subsection illustrates how the functional benefits of interagency
transfers of adjudication authority, including the possible emergence of a
"responsible agency" and improved agency expertise, are also characteristics of
administrative process privileged by fundamental doctrines of judicial review.
Thus, this subsection suggests that courts should draw on these principles to
ensure that agencies engage in interagency transfers of adjudication authority
that are both high quality and legitimate. This proposal also draws from the
recognition that Article III courts expect bureaucrats to maximize or uphold
competencies like technocratic expertise and efficiency, and norms of due
process, while adjudicating administrative cases.
Overall, if there is a tension between legitimacy and efficiency values, the
transfers should not be affirmed by the courts. In other words, if the transfer is
legitimate but not beneficial, or beneficial but not legitimate, then it does not
embody a reasonable interpretation of the statute. For purposes of evaluation,
legality is the primary concern, and efficiency secondary, with the caveat that if
an agency bases its interagency transfer of adjudication authority on a
delegation of power to coordinate with other agencies, that the legitimacy
question is more likely to be resolved summarily. An ideal outcome of
established judicial review in this arena would be one in which judicial
oversight serves to encourage and shape, not deteriorate, agencies' efforts to
burden-shift in functionally beneficial and constitutionally viable ways.
1. Standing
First, it is important to consider whether and why private parties might
wish to contest the transfers of adjudication authority, and how courts' attention
may be drawn to review such agency processes, given that some adjudication
processes rearranged by interagency transfers of adjudication authority may not
be subject to established Article III appeals.3"3 For instance, the decisions
resulting from the interagency agreement allowing DOL and the EPA to
adjudicate each other's workplace hazard claims3" 4 appear to be appealable to
Article III courts. However, at least a few agreements are not-in particular,
the FDA's adjudication of drug import and export claims on behalf of
303. See Berger, supra note 295, at 2072 ("[Algency decisions outside normal
procedures often escape extra-agency oversight and the ambit of the [Administrative Procedure Act].");
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-86 (1982) (noting that the proper
separation of powers between the executive and judiciary is disturbed when a non-Article III court may
"issue final judgments, which are binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal").
304. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Labor
Occupational Safety & Health Admin. and the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Enf. § III(C) (Feb. 13,
1991) (creating an apparent right for claimants to appeal the co-adjudication of workplace hazard claims
by DOL/EPA to Article II courts); OSHA Act of 1970, 29 USC 655(f).
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Treasury, °5 and the OFCCP's adjudication of Title VII claims on behalf of the
EEOC.30 6 Further, litigants may have an interest in protesting the transfers
either prior to adjudication of their claims or in response to the quality of that
adjudication, and for a variety of reasons. The lawsuit brought against the
EEOC for transfer to the OFCCP of the authority to accept Title VII claims on
behalf of the EEOC represents both of these forms of litigant interests.30 7
Regarding the former, agencies follow different procedures and
evidentiary rules, so litigants may gain an advantage by pursuing adjudication
before a particular agency. For instances, if Congress delegates adjudication to
an agency with a claimant-friendly procedure, the claimant might seek to
protest the transfer of that adjudication to another agency with a different set of
procedures. As for litigating the transfer after the fact of adjudication, private
parties may seek to nullify the original transfer in response to problems with
accountability to legislative expectations or with due process, which were
discussed earlier as potential drawbacks of these transfers, or for any number of
problems in the quality of the agency determination that are specific to the
substance of the adjudication at issue.
Arguably, the agency is not absolved of accountability to those affected
by its transfer of adjudication authority even if a litigant is unaware of the ways
in which a transfer has or may negatively impact the adjudication process, does
not have or has lost standing (for instance, as a seasonal worker30 8), or lacks the
knowledge or resources to challenge the transfer. Thus, claimants affected by
these agreements should have options for pursuing a remedy. One could be by
way of affirmative litigation under the APA. For instance, in the transfer of
authority from DHS to DOL involving the adjudication of H-2B (seasonal, non-
agricultural) worker visas, the claimants brought suit under two theories: one,
that the DOL's adjudication was unlawful under the APA and that the transfer
of adjudication power from DHS to DOL was an "impermissible
subdelegation. '3 9 Lawsuits could also be brought by individuals on the basis of
claims particular to the substance of the adjudication at issue. One example of
this is the set of specific challenges brought against the original MOU between
the OFCCP and EEOC, in addition to the claim that the interagency agreement
went beyond the agencies' statutory authority.31 0 Class action lawsuits, for
305. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Customs Serv. and the
Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 14, 1979); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep't of the
Treasury U.S. Customs Serv. and the Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 20, 1974).
306. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n and the U.S. Dep't of Labor Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs § 7(d) (Nov. 9,
2011).
307. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
308. See G.H. Daniels III & Assocs., Inc., 626 Fed. Appx. 205, 215 n.1 I (10th Cir.
2015) (finding seasonal workers' argument-that the DHS transfer of adjudication authority to DOL
was illegitimate under the APA-to be moot due to passing of seasonal time period).
309. Id. at 207-09, 215.
310. "The appellants challenge the Memorandum on the grounds that (1) it is a
substantive regulation that is beyond the authority of the agencies involved; (2) it impermissibly
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instance in response to problems in larger adjudication schemes like
immigration or Social Security, also present a possible option. These avenues,
although often time- and resource-intensive, may be the best way to draw
attention to problematic transfers administrative adjudication authority.
Conversely, given the burdensome nature of these types of lawsuits, a lack
of such cases does not necessarily indicate that an adjudication regime (for
instance, the federal system of awarding Social Security benefits 3 ) is problem-
free. There may not be the public will to rally behind those harmed, or those
harmed may not realize they have recourse. As a result, courts might choose to
increase their supervision of or even take back some of the judicial power that
has been transferred to agencies, unless certain standards are implemented to
ensure quality, consistency and the protection of rights in agency-led changes
to administrative decision making.
2. Encouraging Agency Responsibility (Mead Doctrine)
Once a court has the opportunity to review an interagency transfer of
adjudication authority, administrative deference doctrine is a traditional lens
through which it could evaluate them. In particular, United States v. Mead3 12 is
responsive to "the heavy reliance of agencies today on ... decentralized forms
of administrative action," thus making it particularly relevant to coordinated
interagency adjudication as a whole. 1 3 Further, Mead is useful to courts
struggling with whether to defer to the results of informal agency activity, 3
because it can help determine whether Congress "implicitly delegated the
relevant authority" even "absent an express delegation. ' 315 In addition, Mead
circumvents the relevancy requirement imposed on the EEOC by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; (3) it violates the Federal Reports Act; (4) it abridges the appellants' privilege against disclosure
of self-evaluative reports; and (5) it violates the Trade Secrets Act." Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger,
609 F.2d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 1979).
311. I would like to thank Nicholas Parrillo for this insight.
312. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The doctrine referenced,
United States v. Mead Corp., is "the most important administrative law decision in many years ......
Vermeule, supra note 186, at 347; see also Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001) (suggesting that a salient feature of the Mead decision is that agency adjudication
activity outside of rulemaking and formal adjudication merits Chevron deference only if circumstances
evidence that Congress intended to delegate authority to agencies to accomplish this action and noting
that Justice Souter's majority opinion in "Mead establishes a finely graded structure of deference with
three categories or tiers: Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and no deference" and noting, also,
that "Justice Scalia's dissenting view, by contrast, would have recognized only two tiers: Chevron
deference and no deference at all."). In the Skidmore decision, the Supreme Court determined that an
information bulletin with standards and guides was not authorized under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Thus, decisions regarding how workers were paid (for
instance, overtime or during "periods of inactivity") made on the basis of those guidelines did not merit
Chevron deference. Id. at 138.
313. See supra notes 136-139.
314. Barron& Kagan, supranote 134, at202.
315. Vermeule, supra note 186, at 352 ("[T]he central point of Mead is to establish a
series of indicators that reviewing courts must use to discern when, absent an express delegation of
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may be applied to "reward, through more deferential judicial review,
interpretations offered by more responsible officials, 3 16 preferably as a result
of thorough procedure.1 7 Also, given that Mead is not a very deferential
standard,3 18 this form of review would ensure these interagency agreements are
not rendered haphazardly or overly often.
In regards to interagency transfers of adjudication authority, this principle
could be applied to determine whether there is a responsible agency that has
taken sufficient control of the coordinated adjudication process in question, and
that can accordingly be held accountable for its quality.319 In this way, the
doctrine could be used to privilege those transfers of power that result in an
agency taking meaningful responsibility for the quality of the process. Under
this framework, a court could evaluate whether Congress clearly intended the
initial agency to keep the adjudicative power in question (or, less likely, clearly
intended for it to be transferred). After this evaluation, courts could engage
with traditional principles of administrative deference by determining whether
the agency is precluded from making a transfer (either based on explicit
limitations in the statute or due to some specific, constitutional constraint) and,
in the likely situation in which this is not the case, whether the agency's
implementation of ambiguous legislation (in particular, legislation empowering
the agency to coordinate) is reasonable.
One current interagency transfer of adjudicative authority that would
benefit from this evaluation is the agreement between the EEOC and OFCCP
regarding transferring Title VII adjudication authority. As discussed earlier,
these agencies have faced litigation for low-quality coordination and related
failure to accomplish tasks related to adjudication.' If they are able to show
that transferring full decision-making authority to the OFCCP has led it to take
authority authorizing the agency action in question, Congress should nonetheless be taken to have
implicitly delegated the relevant authority.").
316. Barron & Kagan, supra note 134, at 201-202 (citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at
243) (arguing that Mead suggests that "internal agency nondelegation doctrine should determine the
rigor of judicial review of an agency's interpretive decisions [by allowing courts to] distinguish among
exercises of this authority based on the identity of the final agency decision maker and then to reward,
through more deferential judicial review, interpretations offered by more responsible officials."); see
also Magill & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1046 ("Under Mead, Chevron applies if and only if Congress
has demonstrated an intention to delegate law-interpreting power to the agency. Whether courts will find
[that the agency holds law-interpreting authority] depends, in part, upon procedural proxies .... ").
317. See Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 251 (2016) (noting that
Mead suggests that courts favor "agency fidelity to more formal, thorough administrative procedures").
318. "Rather than taking ambiguity to signify delegation, Mead establishes that the
default rule runs against delegation." Vermeule, supra note 186, at 348; see also William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1088 (2008).
319. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 134; cf. Berger, supra note 295, at 2058-74
(arguing that that judicial deference to agency action in individual rights cases should hinge in part on
how the agency does its job, and that courts should consider factors including oversight, transparency,
expertise, thoroughness, and use of formalized procedures).
320. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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full responsibility for the process,32 these agencies could establish legitimacy
under this inquiry for their most recent interagency agreement.
In addition to improving any particular administrative adjudication
process before the court, this approach could help create a feedback loop that
shapes agencies' transfers of power over time. Indeed, while a number of
scholars contend that the factors put forth in Mead are vague,322 there is
evidence that agency officials are responsive to courts' determinations under
Mead.323 As such, they may structure future agreements in response to signals
garnered from judicial review. It is worth noting, however, that the use of Mead
and/or any traditional Chevron inquiry may obscure other potential problems
which could impair the court's ability to determine whether the agency merits
deference 324
3. Privileging Agency Expertise (Hard Look Review)
The benefits of administrative expertise have long animated the
movement of adjudication responsibilities from the judicial branch to the
executive branch.325 The Court's recent decision in King v. Burwell suggests, in
particular, that agency expertise may be key to a court's determination that the
authority to coordinate legitimately empowers an agency to transfer its
decision-making authority to another equally or more expert agency.326 Here,
the Court notes that an agency is unlikely to hold the decision-making authority
in question because it does not have the requisite expertise to make the relevant
321. See, e.g., supra notes 143-145.
322. Vermeule, supra note 186, at 349; Hickman supra note 312, at 528-29 ("Scholars
have criticized Mead and its progeny as 'unfortunate,' 'flawed,' and 'incoherent'; a 'mess';
'complicated,' 'unclear,' and 'prone to results-oriented manipulation . . . .' Separately, courts and
scholars have struggled with Mead's application at times, [in part because] the Court's rhetoric about
Mead has been inconsistent, [but more importantly, because Mead constitutes a. meta-standard."); see
generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1443 (2005).
323. "[Riecent empirical research by Lisa Bressman and Abbe Gluck suggests that the
practices and intentions of congressional staffers charged with drafting legislation strongly support the
intuitions driving Mead as well as Chevron-that Congress often but does not always intend to delegate
primary interpretive responsibility to administering agencies rather than courts." Hickman, supra note
312, at 529; see also, Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901,994 (2013).
324. See, e.g., 1185 Ave. of Ams. Assoc. v. RTC, 22 F.3d 494, 497 (2d. Cir. 1994)
(expressing difficulty in establishing what would otherwise be a straightforward Chevron Step One
question in a case where "'Congress has entrusted more than one federal agency with the administration
of a statute' (citations omitted)).
325. See supra note 217; Almendares, supra note 118, at 239 ("[B]road [legislativel
delegations of policymaking authority are part of a strategy that allows the public to take advantage of
the agency's expertise.").
326. Sharkey, supra note 239, at 21 (suggesting that the holding in King "argues in
favor of the court's careful assessment of various forms of coordinated agency action-which might run
the gamut from informal consultation, to cross-referencing respective policy determinations in
rulemakings, to joint rulemaking-in order to determine which is (or are) the relevant agency (or
agencies) with expertise" to make the relevant determination).
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decision,327 despite the fact that the agency consulted closely with the agency
from which it was transferred decision-making power. 328 "The [King] Court's
insistence of relative expertise is reminiscent of ... Gonzales v. Oregon," in
which the Court implied that required expertise combined with coordination
could result in deference to an agency's actions. 9
One fundamental doctrine of judicial review, hard look review, 33' both
privileges expertise 33' and has been found to improve the quality of
327. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) ("It is especially unlikely that
Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health
insurance policy of this sort.").
328. See Sharkey, supra note 239 at 19.
329. Id. at 17 (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon: "The deference here is tempered by the
Attorney General's lack of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any consultation with
anyone outside the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned judgment"); see Gersen, supra
note 12, at 225 (commenting, in reference to Gonzalez, "[w]hen one agency has greater expertise than
another agency, it is not ludicrous to suggest that courts should defer to the more expert one").
330. This doctrine is a standard of judicial review of agency activity articulated by the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (2012). The Supreme Court, in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., gave greater content to and strengthened this
standard by stating:
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
463 U.S. 29,43 (1983). Justice Kagan has commented:
The current version of that doctrine subjects all agency decision making, irrespective
of provenance or pedigree, to wide-ranging judicial review for errors of process: the
courts take a hard look at whether the agencies themselves have taken a hard look at
the range of evidence, arguments, and alternatives relevant to an issue, and have
made and explained a reasoned policy choice based on these considerations.
Kagan, supra note 233, at 2380. See also Merrill, note 300, at 1020 n.195 (noting that the general tenets
of the 'hard look' doctrine include that "agencies must offer detailed explanations for their decisions"
and "they must allow effective participation by affected interests"); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and
the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 181-82 (noting the same). For examples of "hard look"
review in the Supreme Court, see Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986); Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1983); Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983)."); Sharkey, supra note 289, at 1613-15.
331. Hard look doctrine "reflects an ideal vision of the administrative sphere as driven
by experts . " Kagan, supra note 233, at 2380; see also Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The
Contributions of Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 924 (1980)
("The 'hard look' doctrine has been instrumental in raising the consciousness of judges to the view ...
that '[tihe deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia .... '");
Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1447 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Role of Politics]; see also Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEx. L. REV. 483, 493-94 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486,491 (2002); see also
Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J.
1763, 1773-74 (2012) ("[In] hard-look review ... an agency's expertise serves an important role by
helping to legitimize its activities.").
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administrative adjudication, in part because of its emphasis on the evaluation of
agency process. 332 Both of these criteria could be made relevant to the
assessment of policies authorizing interagency transfers of adjudication
authority. During judicial evaluation of an agency's justification for an
interagency transfer of adjudication authority, agencies could be asked to show
that the transfer maintains agency accountability (by elevating the recipient
agency's quality of oversight of the process) and intensifies the expertise
brought to bear in the transferred set of adjudications. For instance, a court
might approve the informal transfer of power from Treasury to the CBP and
then to the FDA in the case of pharmaceutical import and export
determinations, given that the FDA may amplify the application of relevant
expertise to the adjudication of these decisions. Or, a court may decide that by
transferring the adjudication of Title VII cases to an office in DOL that deals
primarily with federal contractors (the OFCCP),333 the EEOC sacrificed agency
expertise for its own procedural convenience, resource conservation, or some
other bureaucratic aim that does not adequately honor legislative intent. If
courts approve of interagency transfers of adjudication authority in which
expert agencies end up with primary responsibility for the process, this would
complement judicial deference doctrine's potential to open up "policy
discretion for agencies that have significant expertise in the fields they
regulate." '334 As a result of the application of hard look review in this context,
courts may also, over time, encourage agencies' overall intensification of their
"exercise of ... authority within [their] substantive field[s] ."3
There are certainly obstacles to effective hard look review of interagency
transfers of decision-making power. First, judges may not have the resources,336
technical expertise,337 or time to determine whether an agency process is
332. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REv. 1755, 1812 (2013) (suggesting that hard look analysis has increased "the incentive for agencies to
raise the quality of their [cost-benefit analyses]" and has thus improved the development and
implementation of agency adjudication); see also Michaels, supra note 317, at 274-78 (advocating for
judicial policing of process over more substantive, "merits"-focused review).
333. See OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (OFCCP),
http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/aboutof.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
334. Gersen, supra note 12, at 228.
335. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
336. For instance, while a close examination of the record is often the way that judges
familiarize themselves enough with a case to evaluate it under hard look, the only "record" that exists
within interagency transfers of adjudication authority consists of the interagency agreement itself, or
informal documentations of the interagency communication allowing the agencies to implement the
agreement. Estreicher, supra note 331, at 905-7 ("[Tihe reviewing court must immerse itself in the
record in order to determine whether the agency's findings and conclusions enjoy the required degree of
factual support and reasoned articulation. . . . [Jiudicial compliance with a congressional directive of
substantive review necessitates sufficient familiarization with the record to permit bona fide assessment
of the saliency of a challenge.").
337. Michaels, supra note 317, at 277. The D.C. Circuit has also suggested that courts
should be wary of engaging in technical analyses of agency adjudications. See, e.g., Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("rT]he necessity to review agency decisions,
if it is to be more than a meaningless exercise, requires enough steeping in technical matters to
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justifiable.33 8 To mitigate these problems, courts might hold a presumption
against deference in these cases339 or place the burden primarily on the agency
to justify its process, 340 thus taking the onus off judges to launch full-scale
investigations into whether these processes are legitimate exercises of
authority. This could lead to agencies' allocating resources to justify those
processes that are likely to be scrutinized under hard look 34' and that may even
implicate complementary legal or constitutional questions.
And yet, it may benefit administrative adjudication if judges have to work
harder to evaluate interagency transfers of adjudication authority and agencies
begin to prioritize the quality of and establish proper authority for these
agreements, other coordinated interagency adjudication processes, and future,
unforeseen agency-led changes to administrative decision-making structures.
This may be especially true given the fact that these processes have the
potential to both reduce transparency and fidelity to legislative and
constitutional expectations, as noted throughout this Article, and also to impact
individuals and stakeholders seeking substantive and procedural competency
from the executive branch.
determine whether the agency 'has exercised a reasoned discretion."'); Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (warning that "substantive review of mathematical and
scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable").
338. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 151-56 (1988); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 548 (2003) ("Many have characterized
the use of the hard look doctrine as an excuse for courts to substitute their generalist judgment for the
specialized judgment of agencies."); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388-94 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to "Hard
Look" Review, 1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 540 ("Those who are against hard look review believe with Steven
[sic] Breyer that it calls on judges to perform a function for which they are not well-suited; or with
Martin Shapiro, that review's inevitable tendency to focus on only a limited number of issues in a
complex proceeding invites a distortion of agency effort and a quite imperfect view of agency process").
339. This approach would be complementary to the application of Mead suggested
earlier in this subsection. See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text.
340. See Kagan, supra note 233, at 2380 ("[Tlhe courts take a hard look at whether the
agencies themselves have taken a hard look at the range of evidence, arguments, and alternatives
relevant to an issue, and have made and explained a reasoned policy choice based on these
considerations."); Estreicher, supra note 331, at 906 ("[T]he primary focus of the 'hard look' doctrine is
on whether the agency took the requisite 'hard look."'); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to
Variety with a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 40 (2010) (noting that "'hard look' doctrine
insist[s] that agencies make their reasoning process explicit"); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1876 (2012)
(noting that hard-look review is "a demand by courts for technical accounts"); Stephen Breyer,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 62-63 (1993) (describing the
virtues of apolitical expertise in the administrative process); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule,
Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 108 (arguing that courts play
an "expertise-forcing" role when agencies fail to provide a technical justification for their decisions).
341. See Strauss, supra note 338, at 540 (noting that another critique of hard look is
that "the programmatic impact on the agency of hard look review is at best mixed and probably
productive of misallocated resources-too much time spent on too few rules, excessive effort in a few
instances producing under-regulation (that is, the absence of funds to make any effort) in others"); see
also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 361-73
(1983).
Yale Journal on Regulation
Theoretically, hard look review could also dissuade agencies from
developing experimental coordination arrangements,342 including potentially
beneficial interagency transfers of adjudication authority or other changes to
administrative decision-making processes, in part because substantiating the
legitimacy of these unusual decision-making structures3 43 may be prohibitively
difficult (especially when it requires efforts from multiple agencies). 344 As a
practical matter, however, hard look is perhaps unlikely to throw a significant
wrench into agency innovation because "it allows an agency to gather and
consider any information that is relevant to its policy decision. 345 Accordingly,
the anticipation of hard look review may not necessarily obstruct agencies from
developing new decision-making structures, but, hopefully, lead them to more
comprehensively account for and coherently structure their interagency
decision-making policies, 346 so that they can better explain to courts later why
the process is, in fact, reasonable.347 As agencies begin to structure more
transparent coordination policies, courts may become better positioned to
evaluate those policies by referring, in future cases, to past successes. 348 This,
in turn, may also create a feedback loop in which agencies structure future
342. See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 929, 980 (2011) (implying that hard look review can curb agency procedural
experimentation).
343. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 181, 228 (2011)
(noting that hard look review seeks to ensure that agencies act on "relevant information" in their
decision making).
344. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 289, at 1594-95 (making a similar argument in the
coordinated rulemaking context).
345. Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court's Regulation of
Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1217-18 (2012) (referring
to hard look review as a boon to modem government partly for this reason).
346. See Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation,
Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 853, n.127 (2013)
(noting that "'hard look' judicial review deters agencies from implementing policies rashly or without
factual basis[,] [which] implies that the agencies are keenly aware of the impending (and near-certain)
judicial review and set their policies accordingly"); see also Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review ofAgency Rulemaking, supra note 331, at 499-502 (1997); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE LJ. 1385, 1385-86
(1992).
347. See Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 331, at 1456 (noting that "[i]t is well
understood that courts vary the effort they use and the rigor they apply to hard look review, depending
on such factors as the importance of the decision and the judges' evaluation of the trustworthiness of the
agency involved to provide careful and unbiased analyses"); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling
Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758 (2006) (describing hard look
review as "an evaluation of the government's explanation of the reasoning supporting that decision");
see also Meazell, supra note 331, at 1773 (noting that hard look review "gives agencies an incentive to
provide full descriptions of their work during the ... adjudicatory process"); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 778 n.86 (2008); Jodi L.
Short, supra note 340, at 1819 ("State Farm's version of hard-look review not only made reason giving
central to administrative policymaking but also made clear what kinds of reasons will suffice.").
348. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1755, 1823 (2013) (suggesting that coordination in the rulemaking context should be
"legitimately transparent such that other institutions like courts and Congress can serve as effective
checks").
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agreements to prioritize the impact of agency expertise in order to increase the
possibility of deference.349
There are, also, longstanding arguments that hard look review can
contribute to the formation of suboptimal administrative arrangements due its
contribution to agency ossification, although these claims may be overstated.
In any case, to the extent hard look review contributes to ossification or leads to
increased inefficiency in agency processes, these drawbacks may impose a
counterintuitively beneficial set of constraints on agencies seeking to transfer
their statutory authority to other agencies. Put a different way, that in-depth
judicial review may also force agencies to slow down and more critically
consider (perhaps even in prospective fear of review) whether these power-
transfer arrangements are of normative value may be a preferred outcome (or,
at least, an unavoidable side-effect of the quality-boosting effect of hard
look 35 1). Indeed, greater efforts from courts and agencies may be "the price we
pay for delegating highly complex important public policy decisions to
unelected administrative agencies, 352 however beneficial this delegation is.
Conclusion
By challenging dominant assumptions about administrative dynamics,
including agency coordination, interagency transfers of adjudication authority
represent a future in which agencies sometimes shift their responsibilities to
one another, often informally, instead of competing to grow their domain.
These and other forms of interagency burden-shifting could deteriorate
administrative transparency and accountability, and they also constitute an
349. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 13, at 329 (describing this potential in the joint
rulemaking context).
350. For a discussion of some studies that suggest the ossification thesis has been
overstated, see Sharkey, supra note 239, at 38 n.162 (citing Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 964 (2008)
(concluding, on the basis of an empirical examination of administrative agency rulemaking, drawing
upon the semi-annual Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions published
between 1983 and 2003, "that the administrative state is not greatly ossified")); and Jason Webb Yackee
& Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1421 (2012) (concluding,
based on analysis of federal agency regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior between
1950 and 1990, that the ossification hypothesis is supported by "mixed and relatively weak" evidence).
351. For an excellent argument in favor of traditional hard look as well as an
intensified hard look review, see Sharkey, supra note 289. For citation of data that suggests hard look
has led to positive results in the quality of agency rulemaking, see Sharkey, supra note 239 (citing
William S. Jordan, i, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly
Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 393, 396 (2000) (concluding, on the basis of empirical study of rulemaking remands issued by
the D.C. Circuit between 1985 and 1995, that hard look review "generally did not significantly impede
agencies in the pursuit of their policy goals")). See also E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How
the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13 (2005); Elizabeth Fisher et al., Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies,
93 TEX.L. REV. 1681 (2015).
352. Jordan, supra note 351, at 444.
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exercise of executive power that risks trespassing on fundamental legislative
authority. Further, by allowing this agency dynamic to grow, the government
and the public risk the backchannel exercise of bureaucratic discretion that may
become both profoundly diffuse and difficult to constrain when it becomes
necessary to do so.
And yet, interagency transfers of adjudication authority are not
synonymous with harmful shirking. Rather, these endogenous changes to
agency jurisdiction have the potential to benefit the quality of administrative
decision making by allowing agencies to resettle power amongst themselves
based on their in-the-trenches knowledge of their own resources and capacity.
As noted earlier, there are practical and functional advantages of interagency
transfers of adjudication authority that would be lost if agencies were
completely prevented from acting on their own assessment of how to improve
administrative process. Further, preventing agencies from making these
agreements may result in fewer agency innovations and perhaps even harm the
evolution of administrative decision making.
This Article argues that agencies should base interagency transfers of
adjudication authority on their legislatively-sanctioned power to coordinate
with one another. Indeed, the power to coordinate grants agencies the flexibility
to improve administrative adjudication in promising new ways while
ameliorating the possibility that agencies might act outside of their jurisdiction
while doing so. Further, adequate oversight of this framework could ensure that
agency instigated alterations to administrative decision-making structures are
both functionally beneficial and constitutionally permissible. In addition, if the
government and stakeholders pay attention to the novel and increasingly
complex decision-making arrangements that agencies are developing amongst
themselves, they may encourage not only effective interagency transfers of
adjudication authority, but also other types of high-quality interagency burden-
shifting arrangements.
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